VIKRAM SOOD'S PERSPECTIVES...

RN KAO MEMORIAL LECTURE BY SHRI NARESH CHANDRA

2012-01-21T13:42:00.003+05:30

India’s Security Challenges in the next decade – Role of Intelligence

I feel greatly honoured and privileged to have been asked to deliver the R. N. Kao Memorial Lecture this year. I believe, it is the sixth in the series started in 2007 by Shri Tharakan, the then Secretary, R&AW . It feels good to be following the five distinguished speakers who have delivered the lecture in previous years.

Before this distinguished gathering, it is hardly necessary to enumerate the achievements of Shri Ramji Kao, one of the most celebrated civil servants of our time and the architect of our secret service. He was given charge of organizing the R&AW in September, 1968. Shri Kao had been associated with the creation of the Aviation Research Centre after 1962. He was able to set up and harness the capacities for both human and technical intelligence so successfully that within a period of less than three years, the Organisation was able to make a most valuable contribution to our triumph in the 1971 conflict.

He is recognized as a father figure and role model for all officers, young and old, in the R&AW and the Directorate General of Security. As a person Shri Kao had an elegant and striking presence. He was measured and precise with his words yet had a keen sense of humour, an amazing human touch and a love for arts.

A significant feature of Shri Kao’s vision for the R&AW was to lay strong emphasis on the quality of manpower and the multi-disciplinary sources from which select personnel should be drawn. He realized that the most important element of the whole exercise was the expertise and the quality of personnel that R&AW could select and motivate for the complex tasks entrusted to the Organisation. He was also the first to recognize the need for having a specialized service like the RAS to develop a body of professionals with core competencies needed by the agency.

I am happy to recall that my first contact with Shri Kao was when he called me on phone in late 1968 to assist in securing release of an IPS officer from UP. All I could do as Deputy Secretary in the Home Ministry was to get the information and inform him that the file was stuck in the office of Chief Secretary. Later, Shri Kao was successful in his attempt to get the services of that officer, who later came to head the R&AW. My last meeting with Kao Saheb was in March, 2001, when I returned to New Delhi from Washington DC. He was gracious enough to invite me to tea at his residence and was generous in his remarks about the improvement of relations with the USA. His analyses of India-US relations and knowledge of the current situation was impressive and as keen as ever. I would always cherish his genial friendly manner and the way he could put junior officers at ease.

Presently engaged in review of National Security systems and issues, in a Task Force, which will make recommendations to Government of India soon, I cannot be very free, therefore, with loud thinking and tentative conclusions at this time. Nevertheless, I will venture to highlight some aspects of the issues involved that might be of interest to the knowledgeable gathering present here. These do not reflect the views being finalized in the Task Force.

To take up the security challenges we might face in the next decade and beyond, it might be appropriate to dwell on what our National Security Doctrine ought to be.

A country’s national security is conceived in terms of its capacity to defend and advance its stated interests and principles. This requires adequacy of infrastructure and the availability of specialized personnel to meet these challenges effectively. National security has come to acquire a much wider connotation comprising not only the traditional aspects of defence and maintenance of public order but also issues of nation’s economic strength, its technological capability along with food and energy security and the quality and well-being of its human resource. It is in this wider context that one has to identify and analyse challenges at present and those emerging in the future and consider the role that intelligence agencies have to perform. Proper intelligence input is essential to taking informed decisions on issues of national security. Intelligence agencies are important arms of the State for meeting external challenges and for the proper management of internal security.

In brief, our national security objectives are: (i) preservation of territorial and maritime integrity of the country; (ii) having friendly relations with all countries; (iii) providing for sustained economic and social development accessible to all; (iv) creating credible capacities to meet conventional and non-conventional threats and challenges emerging from space and cyber space; and (v) nurturing the values of secularism and democracy. These objectives set the agenda for our policies and programmes and bring out the challenges that we face in the future for the successful prosecution of these objectives.

To consider the security environment in which we have to fashion our policies, we find that the global strategic context is changing rapidly, driven by the speed of technology development, realignment of forces with the recent decline in the markets of the West along with emerging economic strength and rise of China and India. Many see in this a strategic shift from the West to the East, but one has to be realistic and not assume that this shift is going to indefinitely endure. Even today, the aggregate size of the economies of the US, Europe and Japan, covering about a tenth of the world’s population have an aggregate GDP which is eight times the size of the combined GDP of China and India, which together account for one-third of human-kind. This imbalance will reduce but gradually as the years roll by and so it needs to be factored in our policies aimed at managing the rebalancing of strategic power internationally.

These developments require careful management of the current global redistribution of power and taking steps to engineer a suitable political equilibrium within a rising Asia. In the economic sphere the main challenge would be in the shape of achieving rapid economic growth, a larger share of international trade and business along with substantial growth in employment opportunities. While every effort would be necessary to expand bilateral trade relations on fair terms of trade, the challenge would be in acquiring the necessary mineral resources for both energy, fertilizer and other industrial inputs in friendly countries. Sustained and broad-based economic development and all inclusive growth are central to strengthening national security. Programmes aimed at employment-generation, along with inclusive economic development remain a challenge. Promoting vast sections of our people out of poverty into gainful occupations has to be recognized as a security imperative.

The main constraint to achieving rapid economic growth is going to be inadequacy of infrastructure, particularly the capacity to meet energy requirements in various sectors of our economy. The problem is likely to get more complex with the threat of climate change that calls for effective national and global intervention. All nations recognize the importance of taking urgent and drastic measures to reduce dependence on fossil fuels that add to greenhouse emissions but their approaches are heavily conditioned by national self-interest. In this area, India will have to be alert to the need for promoting a more equitable sharing of the global commons to secure its right to reasonable share of the ecological and economic space.

Our strategic concern has to seek an external environment in the region and beyond that is conducive to peaceful development and the protection of our value systems. While our policies are centred on the fact that we do not harbour any aggressive designs nor seek to threaten anyone, we have to take all necessary measures to safeguard the country and the interests of the people. We must also keep pace with technological advancement and provide for adequate infrastructure and the human resources required for growth in agriculture and industry and specialized services in the new emerging fields of military technology, cyber security, techint, forensics, etc.

To describe the security challenges nearer home, I would like to mention the rise of China as the first issue. In my view, we should not consider this only in the narrow context of a security threat or challenge, but also take note of the opportunities that emerge from the rapid growth of China’s economy. One need not under-estimate the apprehension generated by the thrust of China’s actions in countries of our neighbourhood, particularly in Pakistan and the coastal areas of our immediate neighbours. We are also yet to deal with and resolve the border disputes persisting in the Northeast as well as the Northwest. The continued military and technological assistance extended to Pakistan by China directly or through North Korea in the sphere of nuclear weapons technology and missile systems has been a dangerous development.

The growth in various sectors in China, especially in defence production capability require concentration of efforts to improve our defence preparedness, much larger capacity for defence production and upgradation of our armed forces. It is a national security requirement that the gap in the size of the economy between China and India does not widen to a level that further increases our concerns for a balanced relationship between the two major powers in Asia. This also highlights the need of improving the capability of our agencies in the area of economic and commercial intelligence.

Our relations with China have elements of cooperation and competition at the same time. While both of us are pre-occupied with internal transformation, we will need much better communication and dialogue to avoid misunderstanding each other’s actions and motives without letting the guard down on the serious security aspects. This is another area in which the role of intelligence agencies is of crucial importance.

While these challenges have to be taken very seriously, the importance of dialogue and building up of trade and investment relations with China have to be accorded priority. China is already our largest trading partner, but the terms of trade need urgent reform. It is also necessary to promote greater understanding of each other by promoting exchanges between the two countries involving not only diplomats and military personnel but also trade delegations and people from various walks of life.

This also highlights the importance of having language experts covering not only the Chinese language but the languages spoken in countries of our extended neighbourhood. There is paucity of language experts today and the capacity to train more people is very limited. Besides ensuring a number of language experts for translation and simultaneous interpretation, it would be necessary to train our own officers in the government and the agencies to acquire proficiency in various foreign languages of importance.

In the case of Pakistan, the situation is likely to remain as difficult and complex as before. Recent trends are even more discouraging. It has now become customary to describe Pakistan in very negative terms, such as a failing state, epicenter of terrorist activities, untrustworthy ally, etc. A noted academic and terrorism analyst has called Pakistan “perhaps the biggest and wobbliest domino on the world stage”.

The fact that the Pakistan military has a number of nuclear devices and associated delivery systems including missiles is a serious cause of concern, not only to India but to all powers committed to non-proliferation. Cooperation with agencies to ensure the provision of necessary safeguards has become international security imperative because of the fear that such weapons, or fissionable material might fall in the hands of non-state actors.

Dealing with the security challenge from Pakistan is a subject by itself and cannot be covered adequately in this address. Suffice it to say that this is the most serious challenge that our armed forces, intelligence and security agencies and the people as a whole have to face in the next decade or more. This is one area in which the armed forces and all the agencies including the NTRO, NATGRID and the recently announced NCTC will need to function in close coordination. Systems will have to be kept under constant review to ensure free and unrestricted flow of information through the entire security network covering many departments. This is essential to ensure that actionable intelligence inputs reach stations where counter measures have to be taken in time.

There is a perception that our humint capacity in our western neighbourhood has declined in recent years. I am sure this area is being given special attention in order to ensure that timely and accurate information is available not only to agencies responsible for counter-terrorism, but also to decision-makers for taking more informed decisions and timely action. While creating the capacities to anticipate and deal with unwelcome developments, infiltration and worse from across the border, we must not lose the long-term objective of having fruitful and friendly relations with people of Pakistan who are our closest neighbour in terms of history, culture and language. While exercising the utmost vigilance and remaining alert, we need to seize every opportunity of communicating with counterpart segments of Pakistani society in the hope of convincing our neighbour that we as a people wish them no harm and would like to partner with them in the overall development of the sub-continent.

Other countries of the region which have to be on our radar screen are Afghanistan, Myanmar, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. While these are all passing through a period of transition, our relations with them would further improve with the resolution of many problems dogging their internal situation.

In the case of Afghanistan, our policy of providing development assistance and support for infrastructure development, training of Afghani personnel and maintenance of certain basic services in that unhappy land must continue according to the wishes of the Government of Afghanistan. For stability in this region a strong government in Kabul is in everybody’s interest.

The situation today is fluid. Deterioration in US-Pakistan relations has created problems for provisioning the US-led NATO forces in Afghanistan. Further reductions planned this year in US force levels would create space for other interested powers, particularly Pakistan to take undue advantage of the situation. Development in Afghanistan and the ground situation needs to be specially monitored to enable making the right choices.

With Nepal, we have the closest and most comprehensive relationship. The fact that we have a largely open border between India and Nepal adds a major security dimension to our relationship. Continued engagement with Nepal with adequate assistance to their development programme is to the mutual benefit of both the countries. Nepal has been fairly cognizant of our security concerns, particularly in ensuring that their territory is not used by any neighbouring country or non-state actors for launching terrorist and other unfriendly acts against India. However, activities of some foreign agencies in Nepal will continue to be of serious concern.

In the case of Sri Lanka, our economic and political support to them should help in securing a more fair and durable political settlement between the major communities of that island. Problems and grievances of the Tamil community, if not adequately addressed by Colombo, have the potential of spilling over to the southern tip of India, creating a complication in India-Sri Lanka relations.

Our sincere efforts to improve the relations with Bangladesh have started to bear fruit, but much still needs to be done to take full advantage of the great potential that exists for cooperation and exploitation of water and mineral resources in a spirit of cooperation and friendship. There is great potential for economic cooperation between India and Bangladesh, including projects which improve connectivity and better road transport between Bangladesh and the territory of India bordering Bangladesh. Mutually beneficial projects have not been able to take off because of domestic political considerations. The situation can improve with sincere diplomatic efforts taking into account the political sensitivities involved on the Bangladeshi side. Lately, Bangladesh government has been quite responsive to our security concerns with regard to insurgent groups making unauthorized use of places in that country in order to regroup, train and make unwelcome inroads into Indian territory.

In the Indian Ocean and the countries of the littoral, India has unique and special responsibilities for ensuring safety of passage of vessels carrying precious cargo, particularly oil, fertilizer and minerals. Besides providing requisite capacity to Indian Navy, cooperative arrangements would need to be worked out with concerned Navies. Effective arrangements for sharing intelligence and commercial information would need to be worked out by our agencies.

Among the security challenges requiring urgent attention, terrorism is the most pressing real and eminent threat; especially from externally sponsored and state-assisted cross-border terrorism. Home-grown terrorism, both complements and adds to the burden. Left-wing extremism is the most serious threat to our internal security.

Note has to be taken of the nexus that exists between terrorist outfits, criminal gangs involved with drug trafficking, gun-running, pushing of fake currency and irregular movement of persons across national borders. This creates a very nefarious network of crime and threat to security that requires a very comprehensive and refined approach. For instance, relevant data and information on the activities of all these elements will need to be compiled, analysed and assessed as a base for supporting preparation of counter-measures by the concerned agencies. Needless to say this requires coordinated efforts by the intelligence agencies, para-military forces and state police. To the extent possible, cooperative assistance will have to be sought from agencies in neighbouring countries.

Within the country, there are serious gaps in our capacity to manage internal security issues effectively. This is a very wide subject but mention needs to be made about the crying need for reforming and modernizing the police force at the level of police stations and districts. There is similar need for augmenting resources for the lower judiciary and the government prosecution branch at the district level. Delays in securing assistance from the police or availing judicial remedy in a fair manner is a major cause of frustration, resentment and disaffection among the people at large. Substantial improvement in these areas is a national security imperative.

Although there is less likelihood of any conventional or full-scale conflict breaking out in the near future, the possibility of limited conflict or skirmishes in sensitive locations on the border or LOC cannot be ruled out. These perceptions require the necessary level of readiness in our capability to respond adequately. Our Defence Services cannot lower their guard in discharge of their paramount responsibility in this respect. Defensive and fighting capabilities of the Services will have to be continually upgraded along with establishing adequate infrastructure. Defence expenditure and programmes for upgradation of military technology, equipment, etc., has to be in reasonable proportion to the capabilities being developed in our neighbourhood. In this area, intelligence agencies have to play an important role in gathering and assessing relevant information to enable more informed decisions being taken by government. Shri Kao had realized the importance of R&AW working with other agencies to optimize the quality of intelligence and analysis generated by different agencies. Cooperative arrangements organised by him were in evidence during the 1971 conflict and thereafter.

The role of intelligence agencies has transformed tremendously and their functions have become manifold. In response to the changing security scenario from days of mere surveillance and information gathering through spies, double agents and police informers, the scene has changed completely with the introduction of new technologies, electronic gadgets and cameras and methods which are not only available to State agencies but also to well-funded terrorist and militant organizations and insurgents. The problem has acquired a new dimension with the ability of these irregular outfits to hire or recruit as their members from among highly qualified personnel. In this context, it is evident that the importance of what the Indian intelligence agencies are required to do cannot be over-emphasized.

Besides the traditional work involving gathering of information, making assessment and producing actionable reports for those in-charge of taking remedial measures, the agencies have now to manage new areas in a fast-changing scenario. For instance, highly specialized and trained personnel are needed to read and decode signals, interpret long distance photo-imageries, do forensic analysis of all explosives and other materials, undertake analytics, do horizon-spotting for anticipating emerging problems and connecting the dots coming out of diverse sources of data collection. The principal challenge in meeting these requirements would be to hire specialized personnel in requisite numbers and train them to the professional level required in the organization. A comprehensive programme of manpower planning and personnel development is going to be the single-most important issue to be tackled. The scene today is not encouraging. There are huge shortages in the agencies, specially in certain critical areas of their work. The rules and procedures for creating posts, recruiting people and the institutional capacity to train them is not adequate to meet this requirement in a timely manner. Finding innovative solutions, more pragmatic and liberalized procedures will need to be adopted to overcome this problem. This whole area is currently being reviewed by the Task Force to examine issues connected with National Security.

It is not necessary to provide for all specialization and skilled manpower within the agencies and government departments. There are experts and analysts available outside the government in the universities, think-tanks, the scientific community, specialists in business and commerce and journalism. I think the time has come for those in the government to reach out more and more to these national assets which are outside the government fold. This can be done not only through cooperative arrangements with necessary safeguards, but also through interchange of specialist personnel between government agencies and non-government institutions. In times of conflict, many nations have adopted such an approach to great advantage. In the US, interchange between government think-tanks and other non-government institutions is very common. In India, we are yet to utilize the substantial potential that exists in this respect.

A revolution in communication and the tremendous expansion of the internet has created a new situation. The utility of monitoring telephonic conversation or intercepting messages on wireless is hardly sufficient any more. Besides the print media and TV, the social media has now a reach which runs into millions with extremely fast communication capable of creating a surge of public opinion and movement faster than any government agency can monitor, let alone control. We have seen highly centralized governments taken by surprise on movements springing on to the streets in unexpectedly large numbers united with a common intent. This is a new destabilizing phenomenon, but the impact of such events is fortunately less in democracies where the media is free and open.

Cyber security threats are very real and pose a serious danger to our security systems. It transcends geographical and domain boundaries and is not subject to control through physical security. The prevalent threats, besides threat and fraud include espionage, sabotage, psywar and propaganda. For adequate cyber security considerable expertise needs to be developed in the areas of cryptography, network security and information security. In fact, establishing and following a cyber security doctrine is the first step to building an effective defence system. Such a doctrine has to be developed for the entire cyber space covering each organization involved with providing or using internet services. Recent experience has shown that threats and actual attacks are becoming more and more unpredictable. This requires preventive measures and contingency plans to deal effectively with the crisis in quick time.

These new developments call for structures and methods enabling much faster response. The earlier divisions and distinctions in the sphere of security and intelligence are no longer valid. The line between internal and external threats has got blurred. Cross-border terrorism has links in our own country and several internal insurgencies and home-grown terrorism has external ramifications, like sanctuaries, training camps, etc., available in neighouring countries.

Earlier the premier intelligence agencies concentrated mainly on strategic intelligence, leaving technical intelligence mostly to security forces and police organizations. Now there is need for greater emphasis on collecting both strategic and technical intelligence. There is increasing requirement for timely and specific intelligence on which rapid response can be planned and executed.

There is also greater need for effective systems and mechanisms for sharing all worthwhile actionable intelligence without delay and for coordination in the follow-up action or response. This requires a holistic view of the entire network through which information flows to the departments and agencies of the Central and State Governments. In all spheres it has been found that important bits of information lie unnoticed and unattended while it would have made a crucial difference in the hands of the concerned authority. This aspect needs to be studied by the major departments and agencies to improve the system of collection, storage and retrieval of information across different turfs in a seamless manner. In the case of sensitive information, officials in the hierarchy can be accorded a level of clearance to enable use with the necessary safeguards.

India is steadily building capabilities to take care of its security concerns largely on its own, but some concerns have international dimensions. In this, diplomacy and strategic partnerships would play an important role, but intelligence cooperation with major powers and countries is also required, particularly in combating international terrorism. We have to always oppose any move to compartmentalize terrorism by considering foreign terrorists as your terrorists and some as ours, depending on their target country. However, we may have to make allowances for each other’s constraints, priorities and areas of divergence of interests.

Suggestions in this regard range from reforms across the board involving setting up of new structures, systems and procedures to the more moderate ones of refinement and modifications of the existing structures and systems, making provision for more radical changes in an evolutionary way. Diverse views need to be examined and studied carefully. The bottom line is that the measures suggested have to be effective and acceptable in the existing and emerging realities. There is the conventional view that systems and procedures evolve over decades along with periodical reviews and modifications from time to time. The other view is that the present structures and systems are not capable at all to deal with new challenges and threats and there should be a major overhaul.

The intelligence apparatus in India conforms to the generally accepted pattern prevalent in democratic countries. Most totalitarian governments and dictatorships follow an integrated system as is the case in communist countries, China, Russia, Pakistan, Myanmar, etc. In democracies like USA, UK, France, Japan, etc., the security service and the secret service have come to be separated. This occurred in India in September, 1968. Separation of normal police, the security service and the secret service provide necessary safeguards in protecting citizens’ rights and upholding due process of law. For instance, the intelligence establishment is not empowered to arrest and detain persons except through and with the help of civil police. The citizen is thus assured that the secret security apparatus cannot touch him directly, but only through normal police where legal and judicial remedies are available. Further, the secret service does not have a role within the country and operates in a manner which is consistent with the overall national security objectives and interests of the country.

The operations of the external agency have certain specialized features. Its officers and operatives often have to work in alien or even hostile environment. We have to see how these intelligence operatives should be best recruited and trained and how to take care of their future prospects. First, we need persons of strong nerves who can take care of themselves in unpredictable circumstances and who can work coolly under pressure, and also having the judgement to guard against various risks and retaining the benefit of deniability. They are expected to do whatever it takes to achieve their objective and yet discharge their duties without breaking the law of their own country, although the rules of engagement differ when they have to operate abroad in unfriendly and hostile territory. We have also to choose people from different backgrounds and walks of life with special skills and aptitudes. Therefore, all recruitment to the organization may not be best done through the normal selection procedures and bodies or into one or two organized services. We have to study procedures in other countries and adopt some features to suit the conditions in our own country. In bringing about any major changes in the system of recruitment the prospects of existing incumbents should not be overlooked.

In the training of recruits, more attention has to be paid to their minds and mental orientation and the overall approach and attitude towards service in the organization they are joining. Needless to say, much more attention has to be given to the practical side of training in addition to theory. At the same time, besides the need for area specialization and acquisition of some special skills, there will be obvious need for diversifying their cover and having different criteria for placement, promotions and remuneration.

In the interest of their work, intelligence agencies have to be provided much greater degree of flexibility and freedom in using public funds and resources. It is not possible to apply the same rules of transparency and audit that are imposed on other departments of the government. On the question of accountability, I find that the views I had expressed several years ago remain largely valid still. If public servants undertake activity with public funds, then a measure of transparency and accountability are questions which cannot be ignored. Being part of the Executive there is no fundamental immunity available to intelligence agencies from parliamentary scrutiny or judicial review. To an extent, this also goes for audit of expenditure incurred by the intelligence agencies. It would be clear to the meanest intelligence, however, that there is no way the intelligence agencies can be expected to function in the open for a substantial part of their operations. If public funds are to be utilized for the purposes described above as functions which intelligence agencies must necessarily perform in the national interest, then a balance has to be struck between two sets of conflicting considerations. It is no use imposing the standard framework of accountability in a manner which brings essential secret and security services to a halt, causing funds and energy to be expended to no effect. We must remember what we are dealing with and what the other side is throwing at us. So in a democracy run by rule of law who is ultimately responsible for striking a balance on this issue, and for making a right choice? In Parliamentary form of government this can be only done by the Prime Minister as chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Security with ultimate accountability to Parliament.

There is also the contradiction involved in the spirit that characterizes the RTI Act on the one hand and the Officials Secret Act on the other. The generally accepted principle in securing right balance is to weigh the pros and cons of putting information in the public domain, keeping in mind that the same would be also available to the interested diplomatic agents of foreign missions based in India. While intelligence agencies are exempted from application of the RTI Act, audit and accountability has to be ensured rather carefully to avoid damage to security interests.

At the same time, it is important for intelligence agencies to devote attention to their image, public relations as well as communication with the media. Closed-door meetings by officers with senior editors on non-attributable basis have helped in the past in managing public opinion in crisis situations. Failure to do so has on occasion resulted in embarrassment and avoidable burden upon those taking important strategic and tactical decisions. This is an area requiring greater interaction and special handling by trained professionals.

I thank Secretary (R&AW), former heads of agencies, members of the media and other distinguished colleagues for enabling me to share my views.

Thank you.

Truth is stranger than science fiction

2012-01-19T12:50:00.002+05:30

H G Wells who gave us The War of the Worlds, the first science fiction novel about Martians landing on earth, is sometimes credited with thinking up the tank in his 1903 short story The Land Ironclads. Jules Verne, after whom the French have named their elegant restaurant atop the Eiffel Tower in Paris, was more famous for his science fiction novel Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea, which created the first fictional submarine, the Nautilus. The Bruce Willis starrer Armageddon was probably as real as John Le Carre's Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy.

Real wars have always been challenges and opportunities to try out new weapons, assess their efficacy, which is usually measured in lethality with minimal loss to the user. Reagan's Afghan jihad proved the efficacy of the Stinger missile that brought down Soviet aircrafts and helicopter gunships and was the one weapon that hurt the Soviet Army the most. The Iraq war in the time of George Bush Sr was marked by the use of precision guided missiles (smart bombs). Nintendo Wars had arrived and the primary and reasonable aim was to achieve destruction of targets and victory with minimal loss of American lives.

Futuristic warfare: US Army is researching towards deploying

Brigade Combat Teams of about 2,500 soldiers, unmanned autonomous

remotely guided robotic systems and equipment meant for Future

Combat Systems by 2025.

George Bush, the Second, fought more than one war more or less simultaneously in Iraq and Afghanistan. This was the era of cluster bombs and the BLU-82B/C-130 weapon system which was first used in Vietnam (more popularly known as daisy cutters that was a 6800 kg conventional bomb that could clear enough forest space for helicopter landings) and eventually, in a variation of surveillance UAVs, Predator UAVs (drones) that killed with precision by remote control were introduced in the Afghan war. Another variation of the drone now making its debut in Afghanistan is a pilotless helicopter intended to fly cargo missions to remote areas rendered dangerous and inaccessible to motor convoys because of road mines and bombs.

This year the US Department of Defence is expected to spend US $ 77.8 billion on R & D. The effort has been a trend towards high intelligent warfare and precision and miniaturised weapons. The idea is to move towards a leaner military machine. For instance, even today an average US infantryman is probably equipped with the lethality and staying power of a company; apart from high quality body armour, he is equipped with GPS, night vision devices, and thermal imaging, communications systems that enable real time intelligence with which he can call in close air or artillery support against targets in all weather. It is estimated that seven such infantrymen have enough weaponry, munitions and staying power to battle off a battalion.

The trend now is towards intelligence weapons systems with precise missions that are network centric, capable of swift decision and superior performance in all echelons with fewer casualties. US Army research is towards deploying Brigade Combat Teams of about 2,500 soldiers, unmanned autonomous remotely guided robotic systems and equipment meant for Future Combat Systems by 2025. The US Navy similarly predicts unmanned, autonomous robots in the water, on the ground and in the air.

The UAV of tomorrow will be the size of bumblebees; there is current research in the US to develop devices that are smaller than birds and called 'smart dust' which are complex sensor systems not much bigger than a pinhead. Millions of such devices could be dropped in enemy territory to provide detailed surveillance and ultimately support offensive war missions. Nano weapons are the other new research weapons along with smart weapons. The American plan of reducing troop strengths abroad would be counter balanced by these new kinds of deployments.

Also by the end of 2030 or 2040, cyber warfare will move centre stage where information control of one's own communication systems and disrupting the enemy's communication, command and control will be the first determinant of military success. The Chinese have been watching these US military developments very closely to see how wars of the future will be conducted. We are still trundling along, unable to decide which artillery gun to buy, leave alone manufacturing one ourselves. We need to pay attention to high-tech research before our Armed forces become military dinosaurs -- quaint but ineffective. This is what will separate the men from the boys in the future.

Source : Mid Day . Mumbai , 19 January 2012, Article written by Vikram Sood ,

former chief of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)

Pakistan- The drama begins to unfold (Amended)

2012-01-12T15:22:00.003+05:30

Until the last weekend there was surreal theatre in Pakistan with shadows boxing each other. The main players in the developing political confrontation were Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan with Pervez Musharraf an incongruous joker in the pack as they all expected to be sworn in as Prime Minister. Imran used the bad metaphor of Tsunami and as it now turns out there is indeed a tsunami sweeping the body politic of Pakistan.

The fog has now lifted and the spotlight has moved away from politics and it now on in on President Zardari, PM Gilani, the Army and the Supreme Court. Both the main alleged conspirators of Memogate - Husain Haqqani was in hiding in the Prime Minister's House as he feared his life was threatened and later Ejaz Mansoor declined to come to Pakistan as he feared for his own security. Today the fog has lifted and it is clear that the confrontation is now head-to-head between the civilian government led by Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani and the PPP led by Asif Zardari against the almighty Army, the ISI and joined by the Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Iftikhar Choudhry.

While the Supreme Court investigates the Memogate it is rather strange that the memo was allegedly written in May it surfaces only in October when Mansoor Ijaz wrote about it. The point is why was this talked of months after writing and why was it referred to at all. Since then relations between the Pak Army and the PPP government have nose dived.

Gilani's midweek statement that the Army chief General Kayani and DG ISI Shuja Pasha had violated the Constitution by sending their reply direct to the Supreme Court instead of routing it through 'competent authorities'. Interestingly, Gilani had said this to the Peoples' Daily Online at a time when Gen Kayani was visiting China. Gilani had obviously used remarks by Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry that an act by a government functionary without approval from the government was unconstitutional. Gilani specifically named General Kayani and Lt Gen Pasha.

The Army responded after Kayani's return, through a statement by its public relations outfit, the ISPR, saying that the allegations by Gilani against the Kayani and Pasha had "very serious ramifications with potentially grievous consequences for the country."

It has also been pointed out that the reply was routed through the Defence Secretary and the Attorney General. The PM retaliated by sacking the Defence Secretary Gen Khaled Naeem Lodhi - the man who had earlier said that the Army was not under civilian control. A civilian, Nargis Sethi who is also Cabinet Secretary and Gilani's confidante will hold additional charge.

The Army has also appointed Brigadier Sarfaraz Ali as the Brigade Commander of 111 Brigade, Rawalpindi - commonly known as the 'Coup Brigade'. The Army has called a meeting of its Principal Staff Officers - all Lt Generals - tomorrow to assess the situation.

This public spat is the one absorbing Pakistan now. Some TV channels have been portraying the Army's case saying that they had sacrificed lives for the nation, fought in FATA and so on and that t was an insult to the sipaah salaar to treat him in this manner. The battle lines have been drawn.

The question uppermost in everybody's mind is: will there be a coup. In the past received wisdom has been that in any confrontation between the Army and the civilians the Army has won. The Supreme Court had earlier declared both PM Gilani and President Zardari as dishonest as it criticised the government's refusal to write to Swiss authorities in the alleged multi-million dollar money laundering case against Zardari.

The Supreme Court may not approve of or acquiesce to a military coup although some say that the Court's pursuit of the Zardari case and its enquiry into Memogate could lead to a judicial coup.

Gilani has been talking to other political parties about early elections; the PPP hopes to gain majority in the Senate and then agree to call for elections. This will happen after March but the crisis is here and now.

In an effort to undercut support to Imran Khan through persons like Shah Mahmood Qureshi who jumped off the PPP bandwagon after he was sacked as Foreign Minister, from Multan, Gilani has been talking about a new province, Seraiki in southern Punjab and also to assist his son who plans to contest from the seat vacated by Qureshi.

In a recent interview with GeoTV President Zardari also asserted that he was not going anywhere but then that is what all politicians say. There was a touch of defiance when asked about Kayani's absence at a Presidential dinner, Zardari said he did not care.

The props for a coup are in place but will it happen? In the past Pakistan has had to face US anger and sanctions following a coup, but circumstances have evolved in the past that converted Pakistan into a stalwart ally. The crisis this time has come at an awkward time for the US as President Obama gets into fighting re-election, needs to keep Afghanistan quiet as he pulls out.

Therefore events in Pakistan are unnecessary distraction for President Obama because a coup will bring in Congressional sanctions at a time when Pakistan is financially and economically broke and the US needs Pak Army's cooperation. Even Pakistan's chosen friends in the Arab world have declined to extend loans to help Pakistan tide over its financial problems.

In this case the US would secretly back the Army despite all the ill feeling in recent weeks while publicly supporting the civilian government. Probably the US would prefer that the PPP government be sacrificed in an early election, something the Army would appreciate and all is well with the world. There would have to be a backroom deal and one would watch out for visits to Qatar.

Attn: News Editors/News Desks: The views expressed in the above article are that of Mr.Vikram Sood, former Secretary R and AW. (ANI)

Pirates of the Arabian Sea and Other problems

2012-01-05T13:29:00.003+05:30

The harrowing and tragic experiences of November 26, 2008 had reflected a failure of all our systems that allowed the three-day carnage. Two years later, in May 2010 by when our maritime alert systems should have improved, a discarded cargo vessel MV Wisdom mysteriously ran aground at Juhu beach.

The ship had been towed close to the Mumbai coast past Bombay High and had narrowly missed hitting the Bandra-Worli Sea Link. While details of what happened have remained shrouded in mystery, there would have been some questions that the intelligence and security agencies would need to answer. For instance, what if the ship had carried some lethal cargo either radioactive, explosives, or CBW? Was it a Trojan horse whose occupants disappeared or was it just a dry run to test our responses?

Concerted Vigil needed: The alliance of terrorists from Lashkar-e-Tayyba with Somali pirates poses a serious maritime security threat to India

For the past few years, the law and order on the high seas of the placid and commercial Arabian Sea has been deteriorating with Somali pirates colluding with the Shahbab terrorists from southern Somalia and the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba of Pakistan. Piracy in the Arabian Sea has been coming dangerously close to the Indian shores

In January 2011, Indian coast guards aborted an attempted piracy attack close to the Lakshadweep while later in March there were two similar piracy attempts -- one about 600 nautical miles west of the Indian coast and another close to the Lakshadweep islands once again. Indian shipping interests have had at least 200 attacks so far from pirates.

Piracy and sea terrorism affect the security and commercial interests of major powers like China who seek to ensure continued supply of energy across the Arabian Sea. China has to take into account two choke points for energy imports -- the Strait of Hormuz or the Malacca Straits, which hurt China, India and Japan. India receives imports amounting to US $ 50 billion and exports worth US $60 billion across the Arabian Sea every year. The Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and then to the Arabian Sea.

About 15.5 million barrels of oil flowed through the Strait every day in 2009 and constituted about 33 per cent of all sea borne trade of oil, which was down from 40 per cent in the previous year. About 75 to 80 per cent of all crude exports were meant for Asian markets -- China, Japan, South Korea and India. It has been estimated by the International Energy Agency that by 2030 China will import 13.1 million barrels of oil per day up from 3.5 million barrels per day in 2006. About half of these imports come from West Asia, which will continue to grow in the coming decades.

Almost due east from the Gulf of Oman is the Gwadar port on the Makran coast of Balochistan. About 550 km south west of the Gulf of Oman in the Arabian Sea is the Gulf of Aden leading to the Suez canal; the southern coast line of the Gulf is Somalia, the home of present day pirates and terrorists.

The Seychelles archipelago, where China seeks berthing facilities, is about 1,350 kms from Somalia and about 2,800 kms from Kerala. China has begun to make moves in Afghanistan and Iran as it sees itself as a successor to the US. Its geo-strategic interests in Pakistan are well known. Securing the seas is a natural prerequisite to ensuring uninterrupted supplies of energy for its factories. It is the triangle of Gwadar, the Strait of Hormuz and Seychelles that would be important to Chinese interests in ensuring a steady supply of energy.

The pirates collect logistical data and raise funds for Al-Shahbab, in exchange for protection. The Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Al-Shahbab alliance would have serious maritime security issues for India and the two could operate out of Karachi more effectively just as the 26/11 terrorists did.

Our long coast line is inadequately manned by counter terrorist or security details. India has to get serious to protect its coastal interests and further afield protect the high seas -- never an easy task. Eternal vigil and strengthening pre-emption capabilities are the best ways of safeguarding against the threat from terrorism and challenges from other powers and their competing interests that would impinge on ours. Platitudes and declarations will not do.

Source : Mid Day , Mumbai , 5th January 2012

The Great Walmart of China !

2012-01-02T11:47:00.002+05:30

Foreign investment is generally beneficial as it creates jobs, adds value, and contributes to the GDP. Companies like Hyundai, Ford and Honda have built a giant automobile industry in India now producing over 2 million cars and tens of thousands of new jobs. By 2017 India will emerge as the third largest car making country in the world producing over 7 million automobiles. This would not be possible without foreign investment, technology and leadership. In sector after sector foreign investment has created huge new capacities catering to domestic and foreign markets. The level of foreign ownership makes little difference to the contribution foreign companies make to the economy. The desirability of foreign investment must never be questioned as long as it creates jobs, adds value and contributes to development. And these are just the factors that go against foreign direct investment in retail.

Study after study in developed and developing countries alike have shown that big box retail rather than creating jobs, destroy jobs. In fact their utility in developed economies is due to the labor savings they achieve. Classical economics was wary of the monopolistic producer who would charge ‘too much’ from the poor working classes while producing the much-needed ‘bread’. The single producer was the dread from which economists sought ‘perfect competition’, meaning many producers catering to many consumers resulting in fair competition in a perfect market. Adam Smith could never have conceived of a global operator with a huge hoard of cash and instant information becoming a ‘sole’ consumer. To the economists ‘monopsony’ was a theoretical concept – to be defined as a construct before belaboring the dangers of a monopoly. The danger of monopsony, seldom thought of by economists as a threat, is now upon us. In the last three decades the advents of giant retailers like Walmart (turnover $422 billion in year ended January 2011) and producers like Nestle (turnover 60.9 billion Euros year on year October 2011) have made monopsony a reality.

The bulk buying and the recourse to monopsonic practices result in pushing down producer prices, undoubtedly with resultant benefits to the consumer. Thus, the more of a commodity large retailers purchase in bulk, the lower the prices growers of agricultural commodities obtain! Studies by FAO and Oxfam attest to this. For instance, a decade ago coffee growers earned $10 billion from a global market of over $30 billion but now they receive less than $6 billion out of a global market $60 billion. The cocoa farmers of Ghana now receive only 3.9% of the price of a typical milk chocolate bar but the retail margin hovers around 34.1%. A banana farmer in South America gets 5% of the retail price of the banana while 34% accrues to distribution and retail.

The table below from “Oxfam: International Commodity Research – Coffee” clearly indicates the price of coffee during the period 1980-2000 plunging as production scales new heights. Analyzing the reason for this the study explains that the major cause for it as follows: “The high level concentration along the coffee supply chain is clearly not to the advantage of producers, who are price takers. Multinationals involved in the coffee sector control an ever- increasing percentage of processing, marketing and retailing. Because they are facing a multitude of small producers in 80 poor countries, multinationals can set the rules of the game. This buyer-driven supply chain means that multinationals capture most of the value-added linked with the production of coffee. Multinationals can put a downward pressure on producer prices by playing one producer against the other or by encouraging new countries or regions to start producing coffee via foreign direct investment.”

The average size of a Walmart is about 100,000 sq.ft and the average turnover of a store is about $ 53.2mn, each employing about 300 workers. The turnover per employee averages $ 175,000. Wal-Mart has a 9% return on assets, a 21% return on equity, and its CEO Michael Duke's $35 million salary, when converted to an hourly wage, worked out to $16,826.92. In comparison to this new employees are paid $8.75 an hour that would gross $13,650 a year. By contrast the average Indian retailer had an annual turnover of Rs. 330,000. Only 4% of the 12 million retail outlets were larger than 500 sq.ft in size. India has 53 towns each with a population over 1 million. If Wal-Mart were to open an average Walmart store in each of these cities and they reached the average Walmart performance per store – we are looking at a total turnover of over Rs. 141,000 million with the employment merely of about 16,000 persons. Extrapolating this with the average trend in India, it would mean displacing about 758,000 persons. Quite clearly Walmart is not going to create more jobs in India. On the contrary it will cause a massive loss of jobs in direct retail. This is the experience in the USA also. A 2004 study by the Pennsylvania State University concludes that counties with Walmart stores suffered increased poverty than those, and suggested that it was the displacement of higher paid workers in small family owned retailers. Another 2007 study has shown that towns in Nebraska with and without Walmart fared similarly different in terms of joblessness and poverty. A study of Wal-Mart’s expansion in Iowa found that 84 percent of all sales at the new Wal-Mart stores came at the expense of existing businesses within the same county. Business Industry analyst, Retail Forward, predicted that for every new Super center that Wal-Mart opens, two local supermarkets will close.

It will appropriate at this stage to consider the sizes of these giant retailers. Walmart’s turnover exceeds the GDP of Norway, which ranks 20 in the list of GDP’s. It’s almost four times the next largest retailer Carrefour. This is indicative of the power of the corporation. Typifying this power was the less than a day visit to India by the Chairman of Walmart Stores Inc, Mr. S. Robson Walters on November 6, 2009, described as a by Walmart as a private visit, and when the only person he called on was the Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh. After he departed Commerce Minister Anand Sharma said: “This is not the time for us to revisit the policy. Single-brand retail is good enough. Those who have commenced operation are happily doing business and so we cannot tweak the policy as of now.” The persuasive powers of such a large corporation can never be underestimated. Despite the unequivocal position of the government, as stated by its Commerce Minister, this very same government on November 24 announced that it was opening up the retail sector to up to 51% foreign ownership. Now one may ask if any of the other stakeholders in India’s retail business would have had such easy access to the higher echelons of government?

The major argument in favor of the benefits a Walmart or Carrefour will bring centers around the perceived benefits to agriculture and better prices to the farmer. Surprising all, Congress general secretary and MP, Rahul Gandhi, told election gatherings across Farrukhabad and Kannauj in UP that FDI would solve the puzzle of a kilogram of potato fetching Rs 2 or less to the farmer and a packet of potato chips costing Rs 10. "A packet of chips is made from just half a potato," he added, virtually turning the opposition to FDI into a conspiracy against farmers. One might suggest to him that PepsiCo has been buying potato and tomato for sometime now without making a dent on farmer prices.

Empirical evidence from many countries where big retail chains dominated show that on the contrary farm realizations actually decline. A recent joint study in Finland by Agrifood Research Finland and Pellervo Economic Research Institute reveals that for each kilo of rye bread purchased in 2010, for which the consumer paid 3.52 Euros, 1.24 went to the seller, while the grower received only 14 cents. A further 1.74 Euros were shared by the milling company and logistics, while the rest went to the state as taxes. The study also revealed that while the trade got 19% of the takings on food, it went up to 29% in 2009. Finally, the study showed that food prices rose faster than other consumer goods between 2000 and 2010. Big business and MNC’s like PepsiCo, Cargill, ConAgra and even ITC and Reliance have been procuring food grains and farm produce for several years now and there is no evidence that general prices have increased. Even where better prices were paid to contract farmers, data available suggests that input costs have been higher. Simple economic logic tells us that nobody pays more for a commodity that can be obtained for less. Business is about extracting profits and not about charity.
Protagonists of FDI in retail talk a lot about modernizing the supply chain. Consider this. The National Sample Survey relating to household expenditures reveals that fruits and vegetables only account for 9.88% of urban household expenditure9. It is widely agreed that the supply chain that links the Indian producer to the domestic consumer is primitive, outmoded and wasteful. Many studies exist that detail the extent of wastage. One will readily concede that large format retailing with its capacity for bulk procurement and capital investment, even if it accounts for a fraction of the retail trade in the sector, might be able to make some headway in modernizing the supply chain.

But before we get into the 'for and against' argument vis-à-vis FDI, we must also ponder over the fact that a modern and nationwide supply chain has been created, indigenously, for milk and milk products which account for 8.11% of household expenditure. Similarly we have an effective supply chain for food items such as cereals, pulses, and sugar and edible oils, which together account for 24.16% of household expenditure. All other non-food goods purchased by our households such as tobacco products and alcohol, processed foods and snacks, toiletries, detergents, garments etc which together account for 52.57% of all urban household expenditure are made available for consumption by modern and efficient supply chains. Thus, what the average household does not get from a modern supply chain is a very small part of its purchase. So the argument that the pro-FDI lobby extends vis-à-vis of FDI in Retail of modernizing the entire supply chain is a bit exaggerated. The supply chain as it is now is mostly modernized and efficient, and what is yet to be modernized covers only a very small part of urban household consumption. The argument then that we need the merchants of the western world like Walmart to modernize just 9.88% of the supply chain is a bit bogus and self-serving.

More than anything else it is Walmart's Chinese connection that should cause us to worry. While Walmart has 352 stores in 130 Chinese cities with a total turnover of $7.5 billion, Walmart directly buys via its procurement centers at Shenzhen and Dalian over $ 290 billion worth of goods from more than 20,000 Chinese suppliers, 70% of its 2010 turnover of $420 billion. Of this over $60 billion of goods are exported to the USA alone, making Walmart the fifth largest exporter to the USA, and also suggesting that Walmart’s procurement from China is the major source of its profits.

With its huge monopsonic power, Walmart actually depresses wages, by forcing suppliers to cut costs. A good example to demonstrate the low wages in the Chinese labour market is contained in a report by Thomas Fuller in The International Herald Tribune of August 3, 2006, which investigated the percentage split in profit in the shoe industry between the Chinese factories and those who market and sell the finished products in the US and Europe. The factory owners after the laborious process of manufacturing makes a profit margin of 65 cents per pair of shoes, which are sold ex-factory for $15.30. “A major U.S. retailer, after factoring in shipping, store rent and salaries, sells the boots for $49.99. Assuming a pretax profit margin of about 7 percent, an average among large U.S. retailers, it earns $3.46 on the same pair of boots.” However the story doesn’t end with the unfair profit margins. The Chinese laborers, who make the shoes, box them and even affix the price tag, are the ones who get the worst deal. The International Herald Tribune says “Yet for all the sweat that goes into making shoes in Tianjin, the factory payroll is equivalent to $1.30 a pair, 2.6 percent of the U.S. retail price.” Should the salary of every worker in the Chinese shoe factory be doubled, the retail price in the US would merely go up from $49.99 to $5.29.

Even if one were to ignore the manipulated value of the Yuan to make Chinese made goods export competitive, it is clear that by keeping wages low and without the protections afforded to labor by trade unions, collective bargaining, overtime and assurance of good working conditions, China is in effect subsidizing exports. What the flow of cheap Chinese goods through the Walmart direct pipeline from China into India will do to Indian companies, particularly the SME’s can well be imagined. Even without Walmart, Indian SME’s are being driven out in sector after sector by cheap Chinese imports. For instance there is no light fittings industry left in India. Same for toys. One can well imagine what a Walmart pipeline will do to the hosiery and woolen goods manufacturers in Ludhiana and Tiruppur. The once prosperous clock making industry around Rajkot has almost entirely fled to China. Millions of jobs in the semi-organized sector now stand threatened. In 1985 Sam Walton, the founder of Walmart was forced to say: “Something must be done by all of us in the retailing and manufacturing areas to reverse this serious threat of overseas imports to our free enterprise system… Our company is firmly committed to the philosophy by buying everything possible from suppliers who manufacture their products in the United States.”

We should also be worried about our fast growing trade deficit with China. The trade deficit with China is now likely to exceed last year's record $20 billion figure. India's trade deficit with China widened to $14 billion after seven months this year, as China's overall trade surplus soared to the highest in two-and-a-half years amid an unexpected surge in exports to the European Union. With bilateral trade reaching $41.5 billion in July, by rising 17 per cent and on track to surpass last year's record $61.7 billion figure, the Indian government should be concerned by this latest import data. Burgeoning trade deficits have contributed significantly to the recent steep devaluation of the rupee. But is the government worried enough to seek to narrow the deficit?

Having said all this, one must concede that change is remorseless. The constant displacement of workers by machines and methods is the story of the future. Textile mills made most weavers redundant, just as robots in automobile manufacturing have rendered many workers as surplus. This is the story in all sectors of manufacturing. While the future cannot be avoided there is no need to hasten the pain. Big box retail will bring benefits to many stakeholders; not the least being the state, which will see improved realization of taxes and the construction industry, which will be called to build the new retail centers. Better quality control and good management methods will spread into other sectors and down the supply chain manufacturers will demand from their suppliers what is demanded of them by their buyers.

Given our pressing need to absorb growing numbers from the hinterland into our labor pool, should we exacerbate our problems by facilitating foreign procurement coupled with efficient local distribution, thereby suffocating our own manufacturing industry?

This at a time when we still have not got around to facilitating lower cost and more efficient manufacturing in India through enabling legislation and regulation. The contribution of industry to GDP in 1992-96 and 1997-2003 was 30.9% and 23.7% for India, while for China over roughly the same period it was 62.2% and 58.5%15. We need to address issues at home before we unthinkingly or unintentionally invite problems from abroad. The Government would be better advised to address this issue first, rather than devoting itself entirely to the cause of foreign retailers.

Different countries have dealt with the problem of the sudden onset of giant foreign retailers differently. In Thailand no large markets are permitted within 15 km of the city center. It might be better to follow the Chinese model of caution and hurrying slowly. China just allowed FDI in retail in 1992 and the cap was at 26%. After ten years the cap was raised to 49% when local chains had sufficiently entrenched themselves. 100% FDI in retail was permitted only in 2004, after the infant retailing industry had acquired some muscle. Walmart in China however is a very different company to what it is in then USA or elsewhere. 15000 suppliers serve its China operations alone, and Walmart China claims that over 95% of its goods sold in china are sourced locally.

Even in as liberal an economy as Japan, large-scale retail location law of 2000 stringently regulates factors such as garbage removal, parking, noise and traffic. Recently Carrefour decided to exit Japan by selling off its eight struggling outlets after four years to the Japanese Aeon Co as the extremely cumbersome Japanese regulations blatantly favor its own homegrown retail firms. . Malaysia’s Bumiputra clause insists that 30% of equity is held by indigenous Malayans. Philippines insist that 30% of inventory by value be grown within the country.

The US or European experience shows that retail giants destroyed the livelihood of small shopkeepers, who became employees of such giants for paltry salaries. A retail supermarket encompasses the entire chain and shrinks the intermediaries – lowering costs and removing jobs. In a country with no social security net – the replacement of thousands of retailers by a single large intermediary will shrink jobs by the millions in distribution industry. What option will these millions have then except to take to the street? Many talk of the revolution in retail, but governments must be more concerned with revolutions forming on the streets.

There are ways of achieving the former while avoiding the latter. Two simple suggestions to tweak the policy on the anvil are:

1. Insist that big box retailer’s be foreign exchange neutral. That is, they export as much as they import.

2. Restrict big box retailers to outside municipal limits and to satellite towns instead of restricting them to within the 53 cities with more than a million people each. This will ease the urban chaos and encourage people to move into less expensive housing outside the big cities.

3. And finally, why put limits on foreign equity holdings? Allow companies like Walmart to own 100% of their business in India. At the same time the government must insist that they bring in foreign loans to finance their entire capital investments in India. This will enable Indian financial institutions and banks to remain within sectoral limits and to extend financial assistance to Indian retailers.

Above all the policy maker must realize that while it is an American corporation earning profits for its US shareholders, Walmart is mainly a retailer of Chinese goods. Its business model is quite unique. As Nick Robbins wrote in the context of the East India Company, “By controlling both ends of the chain, the company could buy cheap and sell dear” In this case it means profits for the Americans, jobs for the Chinese.

Article written by Mohan Guruswamy who is Chairman Centre for Policy Analysis, New Delhi and Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation New Delhi. 26th December 2011

Saying Something Different

2011-12-30T14:17:00.007+05:30

2010 was the year of travels and I became a bit of a nomad. Nine holidays must be quite a record. I knew I could do it, so I did! A bit of Kyoto thanks to Stanford, Dubai by the CRS, London with King’s College, Moscow thanks to the ORF, Washington DC organised by the Heritage Foundation and Tel Aviv by the Haifa University, thrown in.

France in the summer, France in early autumn, Goa soon after and I can’t be complaining! It is a hard life and everyone sympathises!

Japan was polite clean orderly with everything in Japanese and you have to love tofu. Everything happens just so. There are no surprises. Kyoto, the city of Buddhist temples, and naturally visits to some of them along the hillside were mandatory.

Moscow, as always, was fascinating with its grandeur and the Zils and Zims have been long been replaced by BMWs, Mercs and Audis. The Tamaras and Irinas of today are svelte, straight from a fashion design magazine and not the ones from Life Magazine of the 1960s. And it was formidable travelling for miles to get to wherever. But Moscow airport was disorganised as always - you never know whether you are going to get on board the flight. A quick mental check about the money in hand just in case one misses the flight is not very comforting.

December in the US was, as always, cold but welcoming; that is after I was able to convince the immigration that I had no intention of staying on and after I had explained what a think tank was. DC was also about exquisite Argentinian wine the Gougenheim Cabernet Sauvignon 2009 with Wild Alaska salmon. Oh heavenly joy.

Dubai was a first time but could not have been much fun in the blistering heat of June. One could see gigantic cranes standing by idle - the slowdown was obvious. London was familiar territory where very serious discussions about the neighbourhood were followed by some even more serious pub crawling ending up at the Spaniard’s Inn in Hampstead. Charles Dickens wrote about it in the Pickwick papers and they say that Keats wrote his Ode to a Nightingale here as he sipped his claret.

Tel Aviv and Jerusalem were hard work starting from seven in the morning till crash time at night. Oh those Israelis... But both in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem there were far fewer policemen on the streets as compared to Delhi.

The French have a word for their holidays. Depaysement. Translated means leaving your country/region behind and adapting to local surroundings. Adapt. Merge. Become incognito. Imbibe. So in Bordeaux, go for the Margaux rouge although the man from Bourgogne would swear by his wine. In St Tropez a person must have the right kind of clothes or a lack of them, to display the right kind of figure, otherwise wiser to stay away and one is bound to be noticed for wearing too many clothes. France part one was about bonding and about enjoying the summer in the valley between the Vercours, Belledonne and Chartreuese mountains in the Alps. It was also about imbibing the wine and the cheese. France part two was wine from Val de Loire and more cheese and finally that most elegant city, Paris where a great deal happens and great deal could happen.

You just cannot visit France without having depaysement with its culture of food. as in bread and baguettes, salades, the main course and the dessert and the cafe , its wines from Bourgogne, Bordeaux or Val de Loire. Its cheeses and it was perhaps de Gaulle (or was it Churchill) who said that a country that produces three hundred and fifty varieties of cheese is not easy to govern. Sarkozy is the latest to discover this. Food in France is both an art and a religion which makes Christianity the second most important religion and Islam the third. So I imbibed the first religion with great enthusiasm. And the restaurants.- don’t ever forget the restaurants of France whether it is the Closerie des Lilas in the 15th District where Ernest Hemingway spent a lot of time, or the La Gare in the 16th built on what was a train station or the La Petite Chaise the oldest restaurant in Paris (1686) down rue de Grenelle. Or in the Alps the Auberge just beyond the golf course of Correncon en Vercours. You have to walk all the way to have the most exquisite omelettes ever. Or the tartes and quiche at the Tarteline in Grenoble or the fish at the restaurant l’Est in Lyon.
When it snows in Champagnier

The French Alps on the way to Chanrousse the ski resort
A four day stay at the charming 13th-15th century farm house - Ferme de la Ranconniere in Crepon, Normandy not far from the coast where the Allies landed in 1944 was a wonderful experience. Crepon had a population of 205 and when the ten of us arrived, the population increased by 5 percent. It did have its cathedral with the soldiers of the Second World War buried there, one boucherie, a small bar and a barber shop. That was the village centre. It was in the battles around Crepon in 1944 that Company Sergeant Major Hollis was awarded the VC. A double espresso at a road side cafe in Bayeaux town was exquisite. The aroma still lingers.

A Bayeaux street
The Baueaux Catherdal associated with Thomas Becket the Archbishop of Canterbury who was a Norman.
Ferme de la Ranconniere at Crepon village looked like this...

Goa teaches you depaysement differently. So it was barefoot beachcombers on Baga beach at sunset and trying tiger prawns at Brittos. Over rated, I thought. Maybe should have tried the pizzas at Fiesta’s but the ‘foreigners’ were keen about soaking in the local flavour. Goa also teaches the meaning of siesta.

The Airport bus at Delhi was full of mehndi & lal chura brides in jeans or khakhi capris looking happily incongruous with the chura climbing all the up to the elbow and mehndi bharey feet in sneakers . Being traditional and practical. Then in the bus there was Permanent Pout in mithai Pink not talking to her Groucho in Grey. Got off the wrong side of their bed maybe? Groucho-in-Grey was to later distinguish himself when he ventured into the aircraft loo but forgot to bolt the door. The lady who unsuspectingly followed.....

It’s amazing how many men sleep with their mouths open. I counted eleven that day on the flight to Goa.

Did the mandatory sightseeing. Fort Aguada for instance. Rugged and austere. Built by the Portuguese in 1612 for security and commerce. Quite unlike our Red Forts which served little strategic purpose and were really dainty palaces with their Diwan e Khas , Diwan e Am & their khwab gahs. Artificial brocade pink saree with sneakers and a funny hat at the Fort was depaysement Indian ishtyle. Then the Sahakari spice farm, the Mapusa spice market, the Salim Ali bird sanctuary and the dolphins. True family bonding.

Three weeks of bliss in France and no thoughts, not even strategic yet the world carried on. How dispensible! In France I noticed happily they didn’t cover India on their TV or news; in Goa they didn’t cover Dilli! Even NDTV or Times Now or whatever wasn’t to be seen. So peaceful. And all was still well with the world.

And how come the Goans had such wonderful roads even in their villages while we don’t even in our national capital. But in Dilli we had CWG and a lot of stories about the games. .
Next time around we must travel with a camera; cell phone photos are just not good enough.

For those interested in the good things in life, this was it ....
Ranaji bhejeo ....
For those wanting peace and quiet

Sunset at Baga beach
For those who want to travel differently it was ....

James Bond’s new Aston Martin on the way into Goa

2011 was different. It was “a stay at home year”; some losses, some gains, like in life. Maybe 2012 will be different – there will surely be some gains and some losses!

Happy New Year to all who read this!

Author : Vikram Sood

Manipulations and deals

2011-12-28T11:31:00.002+05:30

It was in 1988 that a Pakistani dictator had to die before the country could have another chance at democracy.

Nearly twenty years later, another dictator had to be thrown out before the people of Pakistan could hope for another shot at democracy. Then, as now, these hopes seem to have been belied.
Then, as now, the Army rules supreme, by remote control most of the time, by manipulation at other times or by revealing its hand when necessary. The doctrine of necessity has been a wonderfully useful and abiding doctrine for the Pak Army. Today we have the President of Pakistan pitted against his Army Chief.

What is happening today in Pakistan borders on the bizarre? It hovers between a Greek tragedy and a march of folly where the protagonists know they are moving towards an abyss but are unable to stop themselves. A letter which is believed to be the handiwork of a maverick and a loose cannon and which any responsible leadership would have scoffed at has become the cause celebre.

The Pak Army, paranoid about most issues, has taken upon itself to convert this letter episode into a national security issue and challenge the civilian government for trying to keep the Army under control. The civilian government of Prime Minister Reza Shah Gilani has taken upon itself rather bravely to challenge the Army's supremacy.

PPP and Pak Army relations were strained ever since the time Z A Bhutto walked out on Field Marshall Ayub Khan in 1966 and formed the PPP. Bhutto's hanging by Zia set the seal on a frosty, mutually suspicious and hostile relationship between the Army and the PPP.
This hostility saw the Army's unsuccessful endeavour to prevent BB from attaining power in 1988. Nawaz Sharif was the Army's candidate then and this is the game the Army has played consistently since then. Having failed in preventing her election, it succeeded in overthrowing BB twice. This is being re- enacted again today.

'They' assassinated Benazir on December 27 and four years down the line the world still does not know who 'they' were and it seems, never will. Asif Ali Zardari who had inherited the PPP throne on behalf of his son Bilawal, installed Hussain Haqqani, an Army-hater and a Benazir acolyte as Pakistan's Ambassador in Washington DC. This was a bit in your face kind of thing although he did try to assuage the Army's feelings by giving both Gen Kayani and Gen Pasha three year extensions.

The political opportunism of Nawaz Sharif got the better of him when he failed to see the signals that the Army was playing one major party against the other. Instead of closing ranks with the PPP and with only the March Senate elections in mind, Nawaz Sharif thought he would go for the PPP jugular and filed a petition in the Supreme Court on the Memogate scandal. Maybe this was the result of some secret talks that PML(N)'s leadership believed to have had with a brigadier of the Intelligence. It is well known that the Supreme Court led by the Chief Justice Ifthikar Choudhry is not well disposed towards Asif Zardari.

Imran Khan is the new hope of many and who see him as the man who will save Pakistan. Other political fortune hunters have also begun to jump ship and members of the PPP and the PML(N) as well as die hard right wingers have sworn allegiance to Imran's Pakistan Tehrik e Insaf. If his latest rally in Karachi on December 25 is anything to go by, then the PPP and the PML(N) have something to worry about and the Army would begin to feel smug.

Earlier on December 18, the so-called Difa e Pakistan (Defence of Pakistan Council) rally in Lahore must have sent shivers down the spine of Pakistan's major political parties and the democratic forces. About 40-odd Islamist and jihadist parties had got together under the banner of Difa e Pakistan which was actually a show of force by the Jamaat ut Dawa (the cradle to which the Lashkar e Tayyaba belongs) threatened the US and NATO and India with jihad (with special reference to violent jihad in Kashmir) as that was an obligation upon all Muslims, that that there was no question of MFN status for India. This combination is presented both as a terrible alternative to Tehrik Insaf and a reworked version of either the IJI of Nawaz Sharif time or the MMA of Musharraf's time.

Everyone knows that the JuD is only a proxy for the military in Pakistan. And we still hear comments that the Pakistan military is on board for a more normal relationship with India. Or we take solace in the fact that the US is Pakistan's enemy number one, almost as if we are grateful to be let off the hook.

The Pakistan military has been having problems in 2010 mostly connected with the war on Terror. The US raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in May, the terrorist attack on PNS Mehran in Karachi a few days later and the Mohmand attack in November by NATO forces that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers only heightened the image that the Army was incapable of performing its primary role - the defence of the nation. The image of the Army has to be refurbished once again. The PPP has to be finished forever through what is now called a soft quasi judicial coup that would bring in the likes of Imran Khan centre stage with the Army controlling events backstage.

And Islamabad must have a more amenable person leading the civilian government who is also acceptable in the West.

This may be part of a typical sand model exercise of the Army but there is nothing in politics that works according to sand models. (ANI)

Source: ANI , 27th December 2011, The views expressed in the above article are that of Mr. Vikram Sood

Pak is China's low hedge against India

2011-12-23T12:49:00.005+05:30

It was a very perturbed Sardar Patel who wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru on November 7, 1950, pointing out that by our silence at the UN we had accepted Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.

In a forceful letter, the Sardar, not a man to mince words, warned that "The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention" but in fact "it is not a friend speaking in that language, but a potential enemy."

He then detailed ten steps that needed to be considered to strengthen our internal border security and defences, especially in the north-east. The tragedy is that this letter was apparently never discussed. Till 1950, India had borders with Tibet not with China and by accepting China's suzerainty we became direct neighbours. Also, this concession in effect gave China a border with Bhutan, Nepal, India and Pak-Occupied- Kashmir. China now had the potential to be a player in South Asia.

Forging selfish ties: China is using Pakistan as a stepping stone for
regional dominance and not as an end in itself

Mao's China was turbulent. The Korean War was followed by the disastrous experiments of the Great Leap Forward and the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution. The revolt in Tibet in March 1959 leading to the Dalai Lama's flight to India added to China's paranoia. The Chinese thought it necessary to warn India through its Ambassador Pan Tzu-li in a letter to Prime Minister Nehru in May 1959, saying that China would make common cause with Pakistan. This would force India to face diplomatic and military pressure on two fronts. Therein lay the beginning of an all-weather affair that is deeper than the oceans and higher than the mountains.

1962 and 1965 were landmark years when India was involved in conflicts with both her neighbours. This provided an opportunity for Pakistan to get closer to China and the two have remained locked in a warm usually unquestioned embrace. For China, becoming Pakistan's largest arms supplier to match Indian acquisitions ” conventional, delivery systems and nuclear weaponry was a convenient hedge against India, and Pakistan thus strengthened by American indulgence and Chinese connivance felt emboldened to hone its assistance to terrorists as a low cost, highly effective foreign policy option.

Revived by Deng Xiaoping's four modernisations, China has used Pakistan's hostility towards India as a bridge for accessing West Asia not just as a counter to the US. It seeks geostrategic space and the rich mineral deposits of oil and gas, copper, gold, zinc, lead, iron-ore and aluminium in these countries including Afghanistan and Central Asia. There have been reports of a Saudi-Pakistan-China tie up on nuclear issues as well.

A Chinese official once told US officials that Pakistan was China's Israel. Pakistanis see China as an assured guarantor against India. The Deep State of Pakistan ” run by its military-jihadi combine, has to realise that the hard state of China is using Pakistan as a stepping stone for regional dominance and not as an end in itself.

Chinese ambitions extend beyond using Pakistan as a low cost secondary deterrent to counter India. Ayesha Siddiqa, one of Pakistan's better known analysts, makes a very valid observation when she says that China is an 'empire by stealth' which is "growing steadily without necessarily taking on the socio-political or economic liabilities of its client states." China will invest only in the extractive industries of Pakistan not in the country's development.

Gwadar on the Makran coast has significance and importance for China only if it has unimpeded access through Gilgit and Baltistan. There has been increased Chinese presence and activity in this region. The additional manpower is ostensibly meant for the several infrastructure projects in Gilgit-Baltistan.

Over time, as India has progressed, China's stance has hardened. It has played up issues ” like paper visas to residents of J&K or not granting visa to the Northern Army Commander and continued intrusions into Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. It has continued with its concerted attempts to keep both Myanmar and Pakistan under its influence to cover both Indian flanks.

Had India heeded Sardar Patel's advice in 1950 we would not perhaps been in this state of feeling surrounded by China in our backyard and the prospect today that Pakistan could become China's Somalia instead of its Israel is no consolation to India.

Source : Mid-Day , 22nd December 2011

Now that Iraq's done

2011-12-21T11:27:00.003+05:30

The Great Game of the 21st Century is being played out in West Asia . This time round, it's about the control of Iran's vast energy resources.

The US’s war in Iraq is over but it has ended in a fiasco. Iraq is unstable and Iran is emerging as the strongest force in the region. However, some believe that Washington has accomplished its mission in Iraq: the US and its allies have managed to regain control over the oil business in the country, which threatened to slip out of their control in 2002. Today, despite the West’s dubious success in Libya and Egypt, and the uncertainties in Syria, Iran remains a prime target for the US and its friends.

Iraq was accused of possessing (non-existent) weapons of mass destruction; in Iran’s case, the target is Tehran’s nuclear weapons programme. The US’s logic is that since Iran is rich in energy resources, it has no reason to produce nuclear energy, which they see as the first step towards achieving Tehran’s final goal of becoming a nuclear State. Iran’s attitude has been ambivalent. Tehran dared to move out of its dependency on the dollar for its energy revenue when it faced sanctions. Since the US and its allies were keen on preventing this, they unleashed a combination of war games, mind games and spy games against Iran. What is unfolding in the region now is a 21st century version of the Great Game. And the targets are oil and gas resources of Iran.

In the media, experts often discuss how Israel, surrounded by hostile nations, is determined to prevent any State from acquiring nuclear weapons and how it might strike Iran. The list of targets in Iran includes nuclear facilities at Isfahan, Natanz and Arak. They also discuss the possible routes the attackers could take, much in the style of the Osirak attack of 1981. But many may not remember that the Mossad, the Israeli military intelligence, and the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission had opposed the Osirak attack. Even today, they are against any such attack. The decision was political then — and would have to be even so today.

However, the US is no longer leading the charge against Iran. In fact, former defence secretary Bob Gates and his successor Leon Panetta, and former senior military commanders, have opposed any Israeli strike. The US has a formidable force in the 6th Fleet patrolling the Mediterranean and the 5th Fleet operating from Bahrain. The Gulf Cooperation Council countries have bought US weapons worth $22 billion in recent years and the Saudis have a deal worth $60 billion pending. With so much firepower in the neighbourhood and hostile Sunni-Arab neighbours, Iran has reasons to worry.

Simultaneously, there is an open discussion about Iranian reactions, which includes the possibility of a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Playing its own version of mind games, the Iranian National Security Committee on December 12 announced that the country would hold a military exercise on how to close the strait. A closure of the strait could push up oil prices astronomically. About 75% of the oil for Asian markets including India, China, Japan and South Korea passes through the strait daily.

Other possible Iranian reactions could include the use of (barely concealed) proxies. Iran could use the Hezbollah and the Hamas to target Israel. Lebanon is also dependent on the Iran-trained Hezbollah, which runs its espionage system, immigration and databases, communication and surveillance. It is the Hezbollah that regularly nabs foreign spies and cripples the Central Intelligence Agency’s security networks.

A covert war-game between Iran and the West is an old story with reports of assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists or attempted assassination of the Saudi ambassador in Washington. The use of the ‘incredibly precise’ Stuxnet worm or the Duqu virus to cripple Iranian systems is now being talked about. The November 12 explosion at an Iranian missile base was suspected to have been the work of the Israeli intelligence. The West seems to be working on new sanctions and an oil embargo.

Meanwhile, Iran and Syria also have their supporters. The Russians have decided to move their nuclear-armed aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov to the shores of Syria along with a flotilla from the Black Sea. The Russians also have geo-strategic interests in Syria and, along with China, have watched the Nato exceed the UN mandate in Libya. Both these countries have been opposing sanctions against Syria, have even larger interests in the oil- and gas-rich Iran and have signed strategic cooperation agreements with Tehran. Russia has been supplying high-tech military technology along with nuclear hardware and hopes to build more nuclear plants in Iran. China, with its growing energy needs, is a major investor in Iran’s energy and infrastructure sectors and has a thriving trade with the country.

It is the control of production and distribution of oil that has helped America’s military and economic rise. The gigantic oil conglomerates bankrolled its post-World War economic boom. The West endeavours to retain control of both. Oil major BP has calculated that the world consumed 13.2 billion tonnes of oil in 2010. In the same year, oil production was only 82 million barrels a day as against the estimated 97 million barrels a day. Future predictions about increased production are not very encouraging either. Worse, the world would need a 40% increase in fossil fuel supplies by 2030 for industrial powers and for sharply increasing demands from China, India and other nations. West Asia’s multiple insecurities affect not only Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States but also global growth which depends on uninterrupted energy supplies.

The Great Game of the century in West Asia is ultimately about the control of the region and its energy resources.

Source : Hindustan Times , 21st December 2011

The road to Tehran lies through Damascus

2011-12-08T11:31:00.004+05:30

There is a serious crisis brewing in West Asia as the US and other Western nations tighten the noose on Syria and Iran. There is no knowing how the denouement will work out. The charge against Iran is the old one -- about its nuclear weapons ambitions -- while the Syrian people must be helped to get rid of their dictator. It would be unfortunate if Iran were to go for the nuclear weapons option.

Yet, drawing lessons from what happened to Libya after it gave up the nuclear option and what has not happened to North Korea because it did not give up, it is difficult to see the present regime or any other regime in Iran, giving up the nuclear weapons option.

Dubious successes in Egypt and Libya have not deterred the West from focusing on Syria and then ultimately, Iran. China is not on board with any harsh action against Iran and Syria. Russia has already despatched its aircraft carrier "Admiral Kuznetsov", along with a destroyer and a frigate from Murmansk to reach the Syrian port of Tartus along with reinforcements from the Black Sea. The US nuclear powered aircraft carrier USS George HW Bush and some naval vessels are anchored off the Syrian coast. Tartus incidentally is defended by the Russian S-300 air defence missile system (comparable to the Patriot).

For the present, the idea seems to be to glower at Iran, indulge in some sabre rattling and sponsor leaks about how the next attack would be configured. The Iranian regime is unlikely to be impressed. Apart from the overt, a ruthless covert war has also been in action in Iran and, surely in Syria too. About three weeks ago there were reports of a major setback to Iran's most advanced missile programme following a huge explosion at a major missile testing site near Tehran.

While the official version described this as an accident, suspicions that this might have been sabotage carried out by the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq (MEK), persist especially after the Stuxnet worm incident that had attacked Iran's uranium production facility at Natanz last year. The Iranians have accused the Americans and the Israelis of espionage, surveillance and sabotage. In a recent incident, the Iranians claimed they had shot down an advanced American RQ-170 drone in eastern Iran.

When the British lifted the ban on the MeK an enraged Tehran saw this as another move to try and destabilise its government. The recent anti-British protests in Tehran were also a reaction against the British move to impose new sanctions against Iran even before the EU had taken a decision. Generally speaking there is a strong move to tighten the sanctions regime against Iran and cripple all industry and financial systems even further.
This is not to suggest that Iran and Syria are angels.

They have supported and built the Hizballah into a formidable force in Lebanon. It has placed thousands of rockets aimed at Israel; has de facto control over Lebanese intelligence, immigration data bases, and the capability to conduct electronic surveillance. Hizballah exhibited its counter-intelligence abilities recently in June this year when it arrested two of its own members as CIA agents. This was followed by assistance in the arrest of 12 CIA spies in Iran in the last week of November.
Surely, the West is not risking a catastrophe to exhibit a sudden upsurge of love for the Syrian people. Damascus is only a stepping stone for the ultimate destination, Tehran. Just as the declared targets in Iraq were its non-existing WMDs in March 2003, Iran's nuclear weapons ambition may really be the camouflage for actual goals.

These would be Iran's abundant oil and gas reserves, its strategic location sitting atop the Persian Gulf, its relative strength compared to the various Arab regimes in the neighbourhood who remain in awe of Iranian power. If the West wishes to retain global dominance, it is imperative that it should have unimpeded access to cheap and abundant oil for itself. Also, that its distribution to rising economic powers and rivals like China and even friends like India, should be controlled. The danger with war rhetoric is that this develops a life of its own and its own deadly logic.

Source : Midday Mumbai , 8th December 2011

Policy Sans Frontiers

2011-12-06T12:47:00.001+05:30

If India leaves Afghanistan at this juncture, it would accept the Chinese game of restricting our role to our national borders

When Jawahar Lal Nehru India’s first Prime Minister tried to explain to Parliament the significance of Aksai Chin, he referred to it as an area where not a blade of grass grew. He was stressing that Aksai Chin was barren, desolate and inhospitable. By implication, therefore, that India had lost only some useless piece of real estate to the Chinese. Mahavir Tyagi, Nehru’s friend and critic, shot back and pointing to his bald head asked “Nothing grows here ..... should it be cut off or given away to someone else?”

This is similar to a suggestion recently that we should leave Afghanistan to Pakistan and come home because we have no interests there anymore. This sounds very much like the proposal from the former US commander in Afghanistan Gen McChrystal who, exasperated by his own lack of success, advocated that India should adopt a lower profile in Afghanistan. There have been many suggestions from US circles that India should satisfy Pakistan by withdrawing from its interests in Afghanistan. They do not recognise regional interests or strategic needs of a nation trying to establish its role in the region.

The argument that we back off Afghanistan is one step ahead of the one offered by Sherry Rehman led report of the Jinnah Institute released in September. The report, that of the elite of Pakistan, accepts India’s role in Afghanistan in a limited way for economic development but suspects that India is far too deeply involved which was against Pakistan’s interests.

There is more than one reason for India to remain engaged in Afghanistan and let us not forget that India would like its extended neighbourhood to be friendly and aware of India’s interests. It is not understood how a Pakistan rampant in Afghanistan will serve Indian interests, even if it is for a short while. A country that has played duplicitously for so long with the US, its main benefactor, is hardly likely to give us great comfort. It will use its strategic depth, something it has striven so hard for so long, to launch attacks on India and still have the deniability that these attacks do not originate from Pakistani soil. It has taken the world two decades and a few hard knocks to accept that Pakistan has been the epicentre of terrorism and this sort of retreat by India will take away this dubious title.

One of the arguments for withdrawal is that no Afghan has ever been involved in nor has the Afghan soil been used for anti-Indian activities. There are today 14 Afghan terrorists in custody in Jodhpur and 7 in Srinagar for terrorist activity in India. We all know the extent of involvement of the Taliban and the ISI in the IC-814 episode in Kandahar in December 1999. Afghan and Pakistani border regions have been notoriously porous and Pakistan has used this for its strategic interests ever since the first Afghan jihad.

Besides, the powerful Haqqani Network, close to the ISI and operating both in Pakistan and Afghanistan is avowedly anti-India. It was this group that carried out the suicide attacks on the Indian Embassy in Kabul. Pakistan’s active role in the insurgency in Afghanistan is far too well known and they have also used the Afghan Shura of Quetta and even inducted elements of the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba for both battle inoculation and as a policy hedge against the Taliban. Training camps like Khost in Afghanistan raided by Clinton’s cruise missiles showed up Pakistani terrorists from Harkat ul Mujahedeen.

The first premise should be that Afghanistan is for Afghans and not Pakistanis, nor is Afghanistan a desolate piece of territory of little or no significance to India and therefore for Pakistan to have. Located as it is, Afghanistan is rich with an estimated US $ 3 trillion worth of vital mineral resources. The Chinese have already moved in with a US $ 3 billion investment in the Anyak copper mines along with a power station and a rail link. We are not far behind with a US $ 6 billion contract for a SAIL-led consortium to develop the rich Hajigak iron ore mines in the Bamyan province, construct a steel plant and a railway network. This is besides the US $ 2 billion that India has committed to Afghanistan.

India and Afghanistan signed the wide ranging Strategic Partnership Agreement last month. This was Afghanistan’s first such agreement signifying the country’s closeness to India and mutual trust between the two nations. In this context, some might even argue that we should be sending troops to Afghanistan to protect Indian investments, and if need be Indian strategic interests. India is poised for a breakthrough and any recommendation calling for withdrawal at this stage makes very little sense.

Afghanistan is not just about India and Pakistan in a supposedly post-US phase. China, because of its growing interest in the region and has strategic interests in trying to reach the Gulf through Afghanistan and Iran. It eyes Afghanistan’s rich mineral resources as vital for its continued economic development especially of the Xinjiang and Tibet regions. It would seek an alternative route to the Gulf and not remain completely dependent on Pakistan seeing how it has used its location to blackmail the US.

Simultaneously, China continues to strengthen its presence in the vital Gilgit-Baltistan area which would ultimately give it better access to Afghanistan. Besides, Iran has abiding interests in Afghanistan as it sees and worries about the growing hold of the radical Sunni Islamist Taliban in that country.

We need to think beyond today and tomorrow but the hereinafter. We need to think of our geo-strategic requirements and geopolitical situation twenty or thirty years from now. A retreat from Afghanistan now would mean accepting the Chinese game of restricting our role to our national frontiers. Nations that think only short term are doomed to oblivion. Nations that think of only their own national boundaries without a forward policy are doomed to remaining small nations. The 21st Century belongs to Asia and we are an important part of that new Asia. Let us not choose a destiny that casts us aside.

Thinking differently is always desirable but thinking dangerously can be fatal.

Source : Hindustan Times, December 5 2011

Pakistan : Life After Mohmand

2011-12-06T12:43:00.002+05:30

When 9/11 happened, the Americans were livid and they descended on Islamabad, Rambo style, threatening General Musharraf with the famous "either you are with us or against us" threat.
Musharraf quickly acquiesced at that time, but played the game for the long haul.
Soon he had beguiled the Americans to airlift stranded Pakistani soldiers and ISI personnel in different parts of Afghanistan but chiefly from Kunduz, Northern Afghanistan. These Pakistanis were assisting the Taliban in final assault on Ahmed Shah Massoud's Tajik fighters of the Northern Alliance.

Musharraf's Pakistan became America's stalwart ally and a major non-NATO ally. The Americans poured in money and goodies for their newfound friend. But soon enough, the friendship began to sour. The U.S., unable to get a hold of Osama Bin Laden, also got diverted to Iraq and the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre went backstage.

Over time, when the Americans returned, matters only became worse. Pakistan had consolidated with the Taliban in its quest for strategic depth in Afghanistan.

It was apparent to all that Pakistan remained duplicitous, although the U.S. went through its customary denial as it followed a policy of public approbation of the ally while there might have been private reprimand.

The strategic interests of the two countries were totally divergent and it was going to be a matter of time before the rupture became fairly open.

On the one hand, Pakistan saw U.S. engagement in the region as being guided by its 'selfish' interests of Afghanistan and terrorism, and suspected that the Americans have been chasing Pakistan's nuclear 'assets'.

On the other hand, Pakistan was equally selfish when it saw this engagement as an opportunity once again, for tackling only its primary enemy, India.

The last decade was symptomatic of a mutually suspicious, exasperating and hostile relationship where Pakistan consistently double-crossed its benefactor, the United States, and maintained a duality in its relations with the various terrorist factions on its soil and in Afghanistan.

Relations nose dived on May 2 this year after the heli-borne U.S. Navy Seals attacked Osama bin Laden's well protected hideout in Abbottabad, close to Pakistan's premier military training academy, Kakul. Osama was killed in the attack and quickly buried at sea, hundreds of miles away.

The attack left the Pakistan Army, which was barely recovering from the vicious and violent onslaught of the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan in the heartland of the Punjab, looking silly and helpless. There was anger that the U.S. had cheated Pakistan by not trusting Pakistan about this attack on its soil. There was double embarrassment that Pakistan was caught out hiding the world's most wanted terrorist with red faces at the GHQ in Rawalpindi that the much vaunted Pakistan Army had been caught napping.

A frustrated and angry Pakistan Army reacted by arresting the doctor who was suspected of having given the information about Osama to the Americans, the TTP fundamentalists reacted by attacking the PNS Mehran Naval base and destroying two of the navy's PC-3 Orion aircraft.
The mutual bickering continued and many Americans were convinced after the OBL incident that Pakistan was consistently double crossing them.

Perhaps at this stage, sometime after May 2011, a decision was taken that the U.S. was on its own and that Pakistan was not a reliable partner.

The extent of duplicity is measured by the fact that Pakistan was using American money to arm terrorists and target US/NATO positions through the Haqqani Networks and sheltering the Afghan Shura, while allowing the use of Pakistan territory at the Shamsi air base to target terrorists - but only those that Pakistan thought were expendable.

The attack, about a mile inside the Mohmand Agency on Pakistan Army positions on November 26 that killed 28 Pak army soldiers, was partly a result of this exasperation in Washington D.C.
There were reports and complaints that in the past six months, Pakistan military positions had been shelling Afghan positions from Mohmand, Dir and Chitral. The targets were in Khost, Nangarhar and Kunar provinces, and according to reports, the shelling between May and August had killed 42 Afghans and wounded 48 others.

Afghan officials also claimed in mid-October that between September 1 and October 17, there were eight cross border incidents from Mohmand into Kunar.

Besides, the NATO/US dependence on Pakistani territory for logistic supplies to their forces in Afghanistan, has reduced over the last few months. Estimated to be down to about 30 percent, the calculation might have been that the possible reaction by Pakistan of closing the crossings from Khyber and Chaman, was a manageable risk.

The reaction from Pakistan has been predictable. The killing of OBL, the attack on the Mehran naval base, and now the attack in Mohmand has grossly undermined the image of the armed forces. There was anger in the rank and file of the Army, causing some concern to General Kayani, who had barely succeeded in restoring morale after the incidents in NWFP and Punjab.
The anger on the street probably forced Islamabad to ask the U.S. to vacate the Shamsi air base in Balochistan, close the border for NATO supplies, approach the UNSC and decided to stay away from the forthcoming Bonn conference on Afghanistan.

The other anger was among the Islamic extremists and, there have been reports of an attempted assassination last Tuesday of a very senior ISI official close to its headquarters in Aabpara, Islamabad.

Official angry responses at the violation of Pakistan sovereignty sits strangely on an administration that has violated these principles on both its neighbours for decades. The excessive display of response is partly for domestic consumption, to cover its own acts in the past and at being caught out as somewhat incompetent to defend the country.

The Muslim world is far too involved at this moment with its own problems to pay much attention to events in Pakistan.

Similarly, Europe is embroiled in an economic crisis and wants to vacate Afghanistan as soon as possible.

Apart from a proforma show of support from China, there would also be concern in Beijing about the growing instability in Pakistan while deteriorating U.S.-Pakistan relations would increase Pakistani dependence on China and the eventual thinning down of US presence in the region would leave a vacuum in South Asia. Given these future changes, China may eventually face a more difficult decision regarding how best to manage relations with Pakistan in order to ensure domestic and regional stability. The question is how.

In America, a survey conducted one day after the Mohmand attack, showed that 55 percent of those polled considered Pakistan as the enemy, and only seven percent considered it a friend. More Republicans (70 percent ) as compared to Democrats (47 percent) considered Pakistan is the enemy.

No wonder Pakistan watcher Bruce Riedel called his book on Pakistan the "Deadly Embrace"; this explains the idiom of the US-Pakistan relationship.

We ourselves are far too involved in our domestic crises to pay any great attention to Pakistan and, the danger for us is, a reaction by thinking out of the box in an absent minded sort of way. It must be lonely out there in Islamabad/Rawalpindi, but histrionics and bravado apart, there is not very much Pakistan can do for its economic survival today without U.S. benevolence.
It is difficult to believe that the NATO attack was an error or that NATO was misled by conniving Afghanis to settle old scores with the Pakistanis. Given the background of repeated attacks into Afghanistan after the May 2 killing of OBL, this was more likely to have been a punitive raid.

It is also likely that this will be ultimately shown as a mistake to provide a fig leaf for restoration of relations. Pakistan now wants a written agreement with guarantees about further co-operation with leaked suggestions that without this Pakistan would pull out of the war on terror, implying also pulling back troops from the western border.

Ultimately, a solution will have to be found and most likely, it will be blood money, a la Raymond Davis, although it will be couched in grand diplomatese. Latest statements from the Pentagon say that this was not a deliberate attack without indicating how the attack took place.

In the immediate short term, India will have to decide its role at the Bonn conference that Pakistan plans to boycott despite pleas from the U.S., Afghanistan and Germany.

It is true that without Pakistan, the Bonn conference will be stultified; at the same time, Pakistan would be reluctant to let India have a field day in Bonn.

Most probably, the West, anxious to have an early settlement and exit, would not still want India to run away with an agenda that does not suit them or Pakistan.

The U.S. wants a higher strategic relationship with India, which does not include agreeing with Indian views on Pakistan.

Our participation in the Bonn conference should bear this in mind.

Whatever happens on Pakistan's western front, nothing is expected to change for India on our border with Pakistan.

The estimated 2500 terrorists that Indian intelligence agencies say are waiting to cross over to India is an indication of the 'war preparedness' in Pakistan.

India is yet to receive voice samples of those who carried out Mumbai 26/11 three years ago.
The attitude of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, more than the speeches of politicians and diplomats, along with the protective attitude of the regime towards these groups, are true barometers of the attitude of the powerful Pakistan Army toward India.

Source : ANI , 2nd December 2011

Pakistan-Intrigues ,Manoeuvres , Aspirations and Turbulence : Memogate -Who Dunnit and Why

2011-12-01T11:10:00.003+05:30

The shortest distance between two points is a straight line. But not in Pakistan, where things evolve in a convoluted and conspiratorial fashion. The replacement of Pakistan’s Ambassador Hussain Haqqani was not through a direct Prime Ministerial order but intrigue through a memo supposedly written by or on behalf of the country’s political leadership to American leadership seeking protection against its own Army and then leaked to seek the removal of those seeking assistance.

Here was a man representing his country’s sovereignty arraigned publicly and equated with a con man known for his propensity to drop names and fabricate information. Nothing indicates the mind of the powers that be in Pakistan than this equation and the eagerness to condemn and punish Haqqani. Surely, Haqqani knew of and about Mansoor Ijaz. Besides, it is indeed very strange that Haqqani should need Ijaz to deliver such a sensitive message. In fact such a memo would not even exist. Discussions of this kind would be only oral.

The contents of the memo are also odd. Five of the six offers are about giving comfort to the US on terrorism; unavoidably, as this has become Pakistan’s identity and chief export. That bit about India and 26/11 Mumbai was odd but designed to convince the Americans that they were serious about changing policy. The received wisdom on this is that this memo is an elaborate and a clumsy fake.

An Army that had been reeling under multiple embarrassments after the Osama bin Laden killing in May needed a come back. Their constant refrain that they did not know the whereabouts of OBL, was exposed. They had been caught harbouring the world’s most wanted terrorist and their most valuable strategic bargaining chip with the Americans. The US trusted the Army even less, loud proclamations notwithstanding. They were shown as incompetent by one section of the population that believed in the creed of OBL and untrustworthy by the rest.
The truth is that the Pak Army has been stalking Husain Haqqani even before he became his country’s representative in DC. He had earned the Army’s permanent enmity after he wrote the book “Pakistan: between mosque and military” in 2005. His appointment as Ambassador in 2008 had left the Army seething. There was no likelihood of Zardari agreeing to remove Haqqani, especially when he was delivering in Washington. There had to be recourse to subterfuge.

In few countries does the Army sit in on judgement about the behaviour of the country’s diplomatic representatives. In the end the Army reasserted its pre-eminence because Haqqani has been replaced by another Benazir acolyte, Sherry Rehman considered to be close to the Army. The difference is that while Hussain Haqqani was an avowed Army-hater, his equally suave successor belongs to the elite of Pakistan which survives through traditionally clever arrangements with the Army. They criticise the Army to show their freedom and independence but that is restricted up to very carefully defined red-lines. For instance, the policy on India will be laid down by the Army; that on Afghanistan similarly defined by GHQ Rawalpindi, currently Pakistan’s real capital. For every crime there has to be a motive and one looks for the obvious gainers. In this case it is the Army of Pakistan.

Pakistan’s Jinnah Institute of which Sherry Rehman was the Chairman till her recent appointment had prepared a report along with the United States Institute of Peace had been released in September this year. The report, titled ‘Pakistan, the United States and the End Game in Afghanistan: Perceptions of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Elite’ seems to reflect the Army’s point of view.

The report identifies identify three main objectives which the “elite” considered necessary in Afghanistan:

· Pakistan’s interests were best served by a relatively stable government in Kabul that is not hostile towards Pakistan and that persistent instability in Afghanistan would have numerous and predictable consequences for Pakistan that it is ill-prepared to tackle.

Pakistan should seek a negotiated configuration with adequate Pashtun representation which would necessarily require the main Taliban factions – particularly Mullah Omar’s “Quetta Shura” Taliban and the Haqqani network – to be part of the new political arrangement. This implies that the Taliban and all Pushtun are interchangeable.

· There was need to restrict Indian presence to development activities and participate in Afghanistan’s economic progress and prosperity. The elite view is that the present Indian engagement was going beyond strictly development. Greater transparency on Indian actions and objectives was needed.

It is believed that Sherry Rehman’s endorses this report. The report is that of the Pakistan’s foreign policy elite. And the elite in Pakistan has always taken care to remain close to the Army for therein lies its security and prosperity.

POLITICAL FORTUNES
The Army having emerged stronger in the latest bout, political parties like the PML (N) and PTI are making the appropriate overtures unlike the PPP which is handicapped by its past animosities with the Army. The PML(N)’s uncomfortable and tenuous honeymoon is over, and sees this as an opportunity to gain ground at the expense of the PPP and also wishes to consolidate against the new player, the PTI of Imran Khan. For this it is necessary to prove loyalties to the strongest force in the country –the Army. Nawaz Sharif has filed a petition in the Supreme Court seeking a probe into the memogate. This follows his demand in Faisalabad on November 20 for a judicial enquiry into the episode with other party stalwarts describing the government as Zardari mafia and Imran Khan as a pawn of the Army.

At this stage, should the Supreme Court decide to hasten the NRO case against Zardari, his government will be under threat. Beleaguered in this fashion, the PPP will have to rely more and more on the Army. At the same time, the Army probably sees its best chance to finish PP for good. Other politicians like Mian Azhar, have started to hedge and have joined Imran Khan. Maybe they sense a snap election. Political uncertainties of this kind only help strengthen the Army’s stranglehold. In all this infighting and the question of survival of some, relations with India will take a back seat. We should forget about issues like MFN that we have been so eager about and cosmetics apart, there is hardly any likelihood of new breakthroughs in the immediate future.

THE STRANGE CASE OF TALKS WITH THE TALIBAN

The case of the on-off talks between the Government and the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is getting curious and curiouser. The Pakistan Taliban declared on November 21 that the talks had commenced, the next day there were denials by the Pak Army; thereafter even the Taliban – or sections of the Taliban also announced that there were no ceasefire talks. To prove their point, they attacked a police station in Dera Ismail Khan killing an officer at dawn on November 22 whereas another Taliban leader had asserted that there was going to be a ceasefire in the South Waziristan area, to allow the month old talks to go ahead. The received wisdom is that there are factions within the TTP with senior leaders close to Hakimullah Mehsud asserting that Mehsud was in favour of a ceasefire. What however, seems to have upset all arrangements is an attempted suicide attack on a very senior ISI officer on Tuesday November 22 near the ISI headquarters in Abpara, Islamabad. Obviously there is a strong faction within the TTP that is opposed to the peace overtures.

There has been a decline in the TTP activities since 2007-08, suggesting a division within the TTP and possibly this has led the government to adopt a harder stance against them. Interior Minister also declared that talks with the TTP were possible only if they were to lay down their arms. The Pushtun does not lay down his arms even in peacetime; to expect him to do so now is being very optimistic.

Peace deals with the TTP have never endured in the past and there has also been a feeling in the government circles that the TTP uses these opportunities to regroup. This scepticism about the present state of affairs is not without substance. It would be extremely difficult to get all the groups to agree to a peace deal and once agreed how long such a deal would last. The future here, which would be the Pakistan government’s first priority on the insurgency front, remains uncertain.

Source : 29th November 2011, Published in DNA Mumbai via ANI News

Assaults on India

2011-11-28T11:10:00.001+05:30

The India Pakistan relationship in recent years has been to a pattern. They hit, we appease. The massive train bombing in Mumbai in 2006 was followed by the NAM Summit in 2007 where we lowered ourselves to Pakistan's level by agreeing that both countries faced the common threat of terrorism.

We ignored that India had suffered from Pakistani terrorism and innumerable killings for decades and Pakistan had just begun to suffer from Pakistani terrorism. Thereafter, the commonality ended. The carnage of Mumbai on November 26, 2008 -- something all of us watched in horror and anguish -- was really Gen Kayani's Kargil against us. It was a declaration of war.

In response we did not even formally suspend the Composite Dialogue. Instead, we had the sell out at Sharm el-Sheikh in July 2009 where we scored a number of own goals.

That has been the pattern since then, beginning with the Delhi fiasco of the Foreign Secretaries' meeting followed by the Islamabad fiasco of the Foreign Ministers' meeting interspersed with dreamy eyed hopes of building trust at Thimpu and ending with the latest foray in the Maldives. Our problem has been that we have made hope a principle of foreign policy and Pakistan has made terrorism a weapon of foreign policy and we are not able to see the futility of the first and the reality of the second.

The reality is harsh and frightening. The reality is that of Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, its linkages with the Deep State of Pakistan embodied in the Pak Army and the ISI and the jihadi paraphernalia. They draw sustenance from each other. While the world is now waking up to the threat, we in India should by now have a clear idea of the kind of threat we face from this terrorist outfit masquerading as a social service NGO. We should be under no delusions about what the future entails as this organisation has the full support of the state.

Three years after Mumbai, despite all our entreaties and dossiers, there has been no joy from Pakistan. Instead we have the Pak Interior Minister suggesting that we hang Qasab, and thereby close the case implying quite clearly we are not going to get what we want from Pakistan. Three years after Mumbai the LeT has grown in strength and range of activities with a presence in at least 22 countries and making it a far more potent threat than any other terrorist organisation.

The LeT's vast terror network extends beyond Pakistan; its terror training establishment of military-jihadi expertise teaches an international alumni. Jihadi training schools are now a lucrative post retirement avenue for retiring Army officers and men who provide international consultancies and specialised training, like creating deep cover operatives. It is estimated that the LeT has over 2,500 offices, employing over 25,000 persons. While its main centre remains at Muridke, near Lahore where it has a sprawling campus, students' hostels, technical institutes, medical centres, its second major infrastructure facility is in Shahdodpur in Sindh.

Its financial resources are enormous -- both domestic from charity contributions, compensation/subsidy from the Army, global donations from Pakistanis abroad and from Saudi Arabia and UAE charities. There is enough money in the LeT coffers to enable purchase of new property worth US $ 6 million in Punjab and Sindh in 2003. Since 2001 a new centre, the Markaz Qadsiya was built in Lahore at a cost of US $9.5 million. All this and more can be found in Wilson John's book "The Caliphate's Soldiers," which is guaranteed to leave many of us very frightened.

Today the LeT is the world's most powerful trans-national, but essentially Punjabi, terrorist group enjoying unending state support. There are no signs that the Pakistani state has any intentions of either even disengaging from LeT's activities to say nothing of dismantling this group.

The fear that there could be a major terrorist attack in India by the LeT or its proxies, is very real. This threat will begin to recede only when the Deep State realises it has to pay a price for such activities. Mere threats to break dialogue, display of misplaced magnanimity or appeals to the international community are unlikely to impress the LeT or its mentors.

Source : Midday, Mumbai , November 24, 2011

Keep the flag flying

2011-11-21T13:33:00.001+05:30

For a country like ours, situated in a tough neighbourhood with no hope of changing our neighbours, it is imperative that we remain prepared for the worst. There is no other choice. The Indian Air Force (IAF) must re-invent itself, not just to ward off threats but with the ability to carry the war into the adversary's camp, and retaliate with speed and massive fire power at targets that impose unacceptable damage. Only this would reflect the reach of a regional power.

The rise of China, the intransigence of Pakistan and India's rise have made it necessary that we prepare today to meet the challenges of tomorrow. Should there be an open conflict, it is more likely to be short, sharp and rely heavily on the use of aircraft, as other nations would want to prevent the escalation to a nuclear exchange. The nation that acquires an upper hand will naturally strike a better post-conflict bargain. The IAF has begun a serious attempt to modernise. India is to acquire six more of the versatile C130J transport aircraft, in addition to the six contracted in 2008. The IAF will induct 10 C17 Globemasters beginning mid 2013 and then acquire six more later. These acquisitions would enhance the IAF's logistic capabilities in the mountainous north and north-east where new air bases are being constructed. Equally important is our strike capability beyond the national frontiers.

There are three kinds of aircraft that seem to be or should be under consideration: the much talked about Multi-role Combat Aircraft (MRCA), the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) at present being jointly manufactured by Russians and Indians the top of the range F35, which the Americans have now offered. What should be under consideration is the long range bomber that has the ability to strike deep.

The MRCA is now a choice between two aircraft — the French Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon — in a deal that could be much higher than the original figure of R42,000 crores. A strict comparison between the two is not realistic. The Rafale weighs 10,000 kg empty and has a maximum weight of 24,500 kg with a combat radius of 1,800 km. The Eurofighter weighs 11,000 kg empty, maximum weight of 23,500 kg with a combat radius of 1,400 km. Moreover, the latter has super cruise capability that allows it to fly at speeds greater than Mach 1 for longer periods. Other aircrafts can only attain this in short bursts during a dog fight or while evading missiles. But since Rafale is wholly French, technology transfer will be easier and the IAF, which has the Mirage on its inventory, presumably feels more comfortable with this kind of aircraft. The multi-nation Eurofighter does not have these advantages, as it is manufactured jointly by countries some of whom have strong embargo laws. One way or the other, a decision on the MRCA is expected to be taken shortly.

Since the MRCA is essentially a replacement for aging aircraft, in the process, it incorporates the natural upgrading of equipment and allows the air force to attain its optimum squadron levels in the future. Would this take care of all our future threats? Any future threat scenario must factor in that the Chinese air force, with its 2,900 fighter aircrafts, is numerically far superior to the IAF. Aircraft like the JH7 with an 1,800 km radius could be deployed from bases in Tibet to strike deep into India. This is apart from the missile deployments in Tibet. The IAF, even after the acquisition of the MRCA, will not have the capability to strike deep into the Han homeland in retaliation to a major strike in our heartland. A retaliatory strike has to make news as well. For this, the IAF would need the Russian TU-22 or SU-34 bomber. Deep penetration aircraft need two pilots in a pressurised cabin with a sleeping bay, a galley and toilet. Pilots on long flying missions need facilities to relax and stretch out. True, retaliation with the BrahMos missile is possible; but a strike by an aircraft deep inside the heartland of the adversary has a different connotation. Besides, the capacity to strike with long-range heavy bombers is a crucial part of any nuclear triad.

The two-seater FGFA being planned with the Russians would have a combat radius of 1,500 km, and is expected to be inducted in 2017. The offer of the F35, a single-seater state of the art multi-role stealth aircraft, is being described as a measure of US confidence in India. The aircraft has three variants priced from $110 million to $140 million and not $65 million, as has been quoted elsewhere. This means that there will be extra/hidden charges. Apart from the initial cost of purchasing any aircraft system, the purchaser has to factor in almost a similar amount for maintenance and upgrade through the life of the machine, expected to last about 40 years. India will have to keep in mind the stringent US EUMA (End Use Monitoring Agreement) while negotiating with the US.

There is still some hesitation in New Delhi about such offers from the US. Pakistan is a US ally and China is America's main economic partner. It would be unwise to expect the US to ignore these interests in favour of India. The F35 may not be faulted on technical qualifications but political considerations would be an important factor. Somewhere in the strategic minds in DC and New Delhi, the ghost of the Cold War and its suspicions still lurk. The US looks for allies in the region as it lowers its profile, India can only offer friendship.

Vikram Sood is former secretary, Research & Analysis Wing. The views expressed by the author are personal.

Source : Hindustan Times , 21st November 2011http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Print/771820.aspx

National Security and Intelligence Reforms

2011-11-10T18:15:00.001+05:30

National security and intelligence reforms
India's external intelligence service the Research and Analysis Wing was formed in 1968, and 43 years later, we are still trying to determine what sort of an organisation would best serve the national purpose. This is a sad reflection on our strategic mindset because although periodic reforms are necessary, we in India are still debating how the organisation should be manned. Some of the questions we should be asking are: What are the security threats that India would face in 2025 or 2030? What kind of an intelligence organisation would thus be needed either to protect our interests, prevent others from upstaging us or, if required, reversing the trend among our rivals. Does the present organisation have the ingredients to deliver? If not, what needs to be done so that we are not found wanting in 2025? In doing so, we have to evolve our own systems and not just copy other systems.Intelligence agencies can prevent wars but cannot by themselves win the wars. This has to be done by the armed forces, or if the threat is economic or technological (cyber, for instance) other experts are required. In India, reforms have been episodic, usually following a debacle and not based on periodic threat assessments. In house reviews have been about cadre reviews and career prospects fixing deputation quotas. Reform has to be more fundamental and far deeper. It must be borne in mind that intelligence agencies and reforms have to be done in the fullness of time and not when a crisis has begun to loom.National threats have changed. There are other transnational threats that no single agency or a single country can handle. Besides, there is no knowing how the new threats will evolve. The rapidly changing technological applications bring their own threats. Catastrophic terrorism, cyber terrorism, remote control missile attacks and virtual wars are the other new threats. International trade and commercial transactions have become faster and more intricate; banking transactions move at the speed of lightning. IT-driven globalisation also covers the criminal world. Interaction between narcotics smugglers, arms merchants, human traffickers and terrorists is that much easier, faster and safer. They all have access to sophisticated denial and deception techniques. Add to this, radical religious terrorists who are affecting India most dramatically and are supported by Pakistan in every way. Intelligence organisations need language skills, interrogation skills, ability to deal with hostages, area and issue expertise, apart from operational skills of a special kind. The normal civil servant, however bright, just does not have these skills or the aptitude. There is no option for the intelligence organisations in India, but to follow the pattern elsewhere --recruit from the open market through advertisements. The ideal of an intelligence organisation is that it has to be unique and is not like any other organisation, department or a ministry. It cannot exist without its mystic; a life of mirrors and masks. It is therefore a system with a mission which then becomes a crusade -- be it downsizing Pakistan, matching up to China or piggy backing on friendly powers. As the CIA used to say, "the secret of our success is the secret of our success"; there are no heroes and the medals are secret. What is the price the government is willing to pay a band of men and women who sacrifice their individuality for anonymity and go against the grain of human nature, is a question that needs to be asked and replied all the time. As with all institutions, intelligence organisations also occasionally face a decline -- for a number of reasons, -- bad internal leadership or disinterest by the political leadership. Robert Gates, who later headed the CIA, describes this well in a long memo he wrote to the then chief, Bill Casey in1981. He said that the CIA was "a case of advanced bureaucratic arteriosclerosis: the arteries are clogging up with careerist bureaucrats who have lost the spark." Any intelligence organisation that is manned by careerists, who are either too old to be moulded or are risk averse, is on a sharp downhill slope. Any government of the day must guard against this because faulty or inaccurate intelligence is far more dangerous than no intelligence.

Midday, Mumbai November 10, 2011

Imran Khan- Just landed or has he just arrived

2011-11-04T11:33:00.002+05:30

Gurgaon, Nov.3 (ANI): The speech (at least on YouTube) lasted about 50 minutes, the mood euphoric, the crowd was raucous at times and the slogans were the usual eulogies ‘Pakistan Zindabad and Imran Khan Zindabad’ almost in the same breath.

The Doyen, Founder and Leader of the Pakistan Tehrik Insaf Party, Imran Khan, perhaps got carried away by the response of the 100000 strong crowd (some say 200000), and said that the only other person who refused to beg was the Qaid-e-Azam that is, apart from Imran himself, he modestly announced.

Imran, the latest political kid on the block, had just elevated himself to new heights. Speaking to the noisy crowd at the Minar-e-Pakistan Lahore on October 30, Imran claimed that what he was starting was not a movement, but a Tsunami that would sweep away corrupt and ineffective leaders.

The question some ask is whether Imran had in fact arrived or had merely landed; meaning that he had a long way to travel. Would Imran be able to overcome the threat from the entrenched feudal lords who run political parties in Pakistan, win electoral battles for his party, something he has not done so far, become a force to reckon with leave alone running the government.

Imran’s attacks on President Asif Zardari and Mian Nawaz, the PML(N) leader, brought the strongest approval from the crowd; anti-Americanism was popular of course, but when he mentioned Kashmir (after several promptings) did not evoke the kind of response politicians in earlier times were able to elicit. It was the economy and the corruption and the hope for change that brought the loudest applause.

A good deal of the response is because of the follies of the other two major parties in Pakistan who matter in Punjab – the PML (N) and the PPP. The PPP is involved in protecting its leader Asif Zardari with cases of corruption pending against him along with several of his close confidantes and cronies, and bolstering the other heir apparent, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari.

The other party, which is in power in Lahore, the PML (N) run by the Sharif brothers like a private fief is also bereft of ideas beyond trying to overthrow the PPP-led government from Islamabad. Ever since democracy was restored, in a manner of speaking, in 1988 after the assassination of Zia-ul-Haq, the longevity of civilian governments has been limited to two or three years.

The only government that lasted more than this was the military government of Gen Musharraf. The present Zardari-Gilani combine is now in its third year. Going by the law of precedence, the grace period for the present regime has run out, the people of Pakistan have run out of patience and they want change.

The powers that be in Rawalpindi, the omnipotent Pakistan Army have their own demons to handle. The US is doing a good deal of heavy breathing while showing sign of getting closer to enemy India, the Chinese are strangely ambivalent on a number of issues despite loud proclamations by Pakistani leaders, the terrorists are running amuck and the assets of Pakistan – the Haqqanis of Waziristan and the Taliban of Quetta are also under the microscope.

The Baloch are restive and sectarian violence continues unabated with Shias the main targets of Sunni groups. Continued instability in Pakistan and an ineffective government, a crumbling economy offers very little hope. The prospect of a military takeover is unthinkable for the present military leadership. Therefore, the facade of a civilian government has to be preserved.

Imran Khan not considered a serious option until recently, is suddenly emerging as the new messiah. But is that really so? One rally does not necessarily translate into electoral victory. Imran Khan has not even reached southern Punjab and Lahore is no longer Punjab.

His party, the PTI, has no standing against the entrenched parties in Sindh – the MQM in the urban areas and the PPP in the rural areas. The party has no presence in Balochistan and is unlikely to make any headway there.

The PTI may be successful in the PakhtoonKhwa-Khyber province largely due to the ineptitude of MMA and the ANP. Even in the Punjab, neither the PPP nor the PML (N) can be considered as washouts although the party could gain in urban areas.
Imran Khan had a dual image. One of a westernised Oxford educated playboy abroad which makes him acceptable outside and the other of an Urdu speaking pro-Islamic politician speaking at home which makes him acceptable to domestic audiences.
He was known to be close to the Jamaat e Islami chief Qazi Hussein Ahmed, was in favour of Islamic laws like the Hudood and Blasphemy laws. Those who have read his autobiography, feel that his comments have been restrained. But this might be an attempt at an image makeover with the western audience that may be willing to accept a man close to the Islamic groupings so long as he promised stability in a turbulent region. It is Imran’s views expressed in Urdu to domestic audiences that will remain more relevant.

It is too early to say if Imran Khan will be able to make a dent in the political structure of Pakistan. One rally in Lahore does not make a Tsunami. To use the cricketing analogies that Imran used in his speech, Pakistan’s best known cricketing legend is batting on a sticky wicket. It is always possible that the forthcoming matches have been fixed elsewhere in Rawalpindi and Abpara to ensure a favourable result. (ANI)

Source : Yahoo News , 3rd November 2011 .

Confused on Kashmir

2011-10-28T12:25:00.001+05:30

It has been said so often by so many but it still bears repetition that Pakistan’s foreign policy agenda has only one item on it — India. For pursuit of this obsession, Pakistan has followed policies in the region that allowed itself to be in a situation where US secretary of state Hillary Clinton rebuked Pakistan while in Pakistan recently. Those of us here who delude ourselves that this would galvanise Pakistan to now quickly change policy might do well to shed this delusion. The rest of us know that Pakistan will not change its policy and indeed it cannot afford to.

Pakistan’s quest for equality, if not supremacy over India, has rested on the tripod of the nuclear option, terrorism and strategic depth in Afghanistan. The China-Pakistan nexus was and is a valuable add-on to both because it continues to give Pakistan added muscle to take on India. Although Pakistan had taken the terror route much earlier, its missile and nuclear capability with a loudly proclaimed low threshold has impressed the West enough, leading to greater adventurism. If China found a low cost option in Pakistan’s ambitions and fears, the Pakistan Army found the terrorists useful and expendable cannon fodder. The nuclear and terrorist weapon provided the Pakistan Army security and primacy.

Pakistan intransigence in meeting US strategic interests along with its duplicity has hobbled US policy rendering it unable to deal with Pakistan either as an enemy or as an ally. Pakistan’s refusal to deal with the Haqqani group as demanded by the Americans indicates the extent to which the former is willing to go down the road on this one. The stoppage of military aid and the fear of a possible stoppage of funds have not deterred Pakistan. If Pakistan can throw out US objections or ignore its protests there is no reason to believe that Pakistan will change its stance on India. The terrorist option will not be scaled down nor will the nuclear option surrendered.
Thus flummoxed by Pakistan obduracy and exasperated by its duplicity, the Americans have been looking for escape clauses, one of them being pressuring India to raise Pakistan’s comfort level on bilateral (read Kashmir) issues so that Pakistan cooperates fully with the US. That is the US position, but that does not mean that this should be India’s position too. And even if it is accepted that talks will do no harm, unilateral concessions under the mistaken belief that we should be magnanimous are counterproductive.

That said, it is worth remembering that Pakistan does not really want to resolve the Kashmir issue because if it does, then the Pakistan Army will lose its most important cause celebre that allows it to retain ownership of Pakistan. There will be a huge problem of redeployment of the jihadi foot soldiers rendered unemployed after Kashmir is “solved”. We should not expect Pakistan to shut down the 42 training camps it has in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Pakistan to train its jihadis against India. Therefore, for us to be continually making concessions reveals a confused policy both with regard to Pakistan and internally with regard to Kashmir. In Kashmir we must learn that we need patience and the urge to do something for the sake of doing something is deeply flawed. Further, that political expediency in Kashmir or anywhere else will always be subsumed by national security considerations.

Take the case of the withdrawal of AFSPA from certain districts of Jammu and Kashmir, come what may. This may be needed to show some political results in the Valley and a measure of independence from New Delhi, and also to blunt the People’s Democratic Party opposition and hastily provide a positive gesture to Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s offer to talk to New Delhi. The issue of the withdrawal of the AFSPA has been discussed in various contexts in the country. The four main provisions of the AFSPA are authority to the Army to arrest, search, engage and destroy. It is only fair that if we expect our Army to counter insurgency within our borders we must provide it legal cover. These powers are much less than what the police has in the state.
Besides, one does not see the wisdom of withdrawing the AFSPA from the border districts knowing that the Pakistani Lashkar-e-Tayyaba is forever trying to infiltrate. Partial withdrawal also means that terrorists could commit terror acts in one district and run to the other for a safe haven. One also wonders if a chief minister can take unilateral decisions on such issues. If Jammu and Kashmir chief minister Omar Abdullah is really interested in making progress on ensuring the withdrawal of the Army, then he could begin by withdrawing the Disturbed Areas Act, which is within his power. Meanwhile, it would be best not to play politics on such issues.
There was an air of inevitability about incidents in Kashmir on the Diwali eve. To suggest that the Army itself orchestrated this is a measure of the general negativity in the country that we are prepared to believe the worst about all our institutions. Mustafa Kamal’s outburst against the Army was irresponsible and unfortunate; subsequent recantations were received with amusement at best or cynicism at worst. We ought to also factor in that if there is peace and tranquillity in Kashmir, Pakistan ceases to be relevant. Pakistan will never want that situation and more, the Pakistan Army cannot afford this.

Eventually, the AFSPA will be withdrawn from Jammu and Kashmir, maybe next year but that should happen as a result of a consensus among all those involved. Till then, we must work towards that consensus. It cannot be that one arm of governance can hold the Centre to ransom. It cannot be that we want to give concessions just to look good. Or shore up domestic political standing. Emotions run high in Srinagar from time to time, but decisions cannot be based on emotion and sentiment; instead there have to be reason and realism. Partial withdrawal of AFSPA is an idea whose time may not have come yet.

Source : Asian Age , 28th October 2011

Balochistan - The Forgotten Province

2011-10-27T15:27:00.000+05:30

Balochistan, the forgotten province
By: Vikram Sood
Date: 2011-10-27

Abductions of Baloch nationals and their disappearances are now routine. In a matter of three days in October, nine mutilated bodies of Baloch missing persons were found from different parts of Balochistan like Khuzdar and Gwadar. This list is endless. The rest of the world is, however, far too involved with what is happening in the Arab world or Afghanistan- Pakistan.

The Baloch have had a long list of economic, political and social discrimination against Islamabad. There are a few courageous writers, and the diaspora that feeds the websites and Twitter. The Human Rights Watch (HRW) in its report, 'We Can Torture, Kill, or Keep You for Years: Enforced Disappearances by Pakistan Security Forces in Balochistan,' says hundreds of people have disappeared since 2005 in Balochistan. The HRW has documented 45 cases of enforced disappearances and torture by Pakistani security forces in 2009 and 2010.

No one really gets to hear of what is happening in the padded cell. The largely forgotten and ignored Baloch however keep reminding the world that they are in the midst of their fifth war of independence against their Punjabi oppressor. Here in India too the Baloch issue is hardly noticed mostly because the western press has not commented on it for months.

This is despite the fact that we are routinely accused of interference in Balochistan and we even admitted to discussing this allegation. (Anyone remember the inglorious communiqu © at Sharm el Sheikh two years ago?) Balochistan has suffered not only from neglect by its own governments but also by the rest of the world.

The nationalists among them insist that Balochistan had declared its independence on August 11, 1947 and want a reversal of that. Their problem is that they are divided, the political structures are weak and that traditional leadership of the Mengals, Marris, Bizenjos and Bugtis has weakened, dispersed or been eliminated. Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, the leader of the Bugti tribe was killed in August 2006.

Akbar Bugti's grandson escaped to Switzerland while Khair Bux's other sons Hyrbair, Mehran and Ghezen live overseas. Balaach Marri, the son of Nawab Khair Bux Marri who himself has campaigned for Baloch independence, was killed in Afghanistan in November 2007.

The Baloch believe that both Akbar Bugti and Balaach Marri were killed under orders from General Musharraf. Added to this have been the killings of Shias, carried out in recent times by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.

These Sunni extremists, are possibly in league with the Taliban's Quetta Shura, adding to the confusion about what is happening in the province. Baloch nationalism is, as before, sought to be suppressed through the use of religious forces.

Balochistan always had a strategic relevance for the West. After Germany surrendered in May 1945, a reappraisal of the long term policy of interests of the British empire argued that Britain must retain its military connection with the subcontinent and that, if necessary, Balochistan should be detached from India.

As it turned out, all of Pakistan came under Anglo-American influence after independence. When the massive Baloch insurrection of 1974 broke out Zulfiqar Bhutto had to resort to the use of the Air Force. Peace was restored after General Zia assumed power in 1977. Since then, till today, the struggle has been intermittent but has never died down.

Balochistan has enormous reserves of gas, gold and copper, as well as untapped sources of oil and uranium. Its strategic importance is also as a prospective energy transit route. It adjoins the Arabian Sea and the Straits of Hormuz, through which 40 per cent of the world's oil resources pass annually. The exploitation of these natural resources in combination with repressive and discriminatory state-run policies have led to armed uprisings in the province.

Logistic supplies to US and NATO forces in Afghanistan which land in Karachi are also routed through Balochistan. This explains why the US/NATO prefer to ignore events in Balochistan. This could, however, change once the US dependency on routes through Pakistan changes to the Northern routes.

Source: The Midday Mumbai, October 27, 2011

The Nature of Our Neighbour

2011-10-13T15:11:00.000+05:30

One was reasonably sure many years ago that Osama was hiding in Pakistan, most probably in the Abbottabad area. Pakistan authorities, however, consistently denied Osama's presence in their country.

But, as it embarrassingly turned out, Osama was living with his family, along with an entire terrorist and communication paraphernalia. This was despite the country's ubiquitous intelligence machinery with its close contacts with the terrorist underworld.

If Islamabad did not know, then its is clear that the terrorists there are running out of control. If Islamabad did know, then it obviously chose not to disclose the information and assist the US in its effort against terrorism. This was either a strategic decision of the rulers for use of assets later, or a tactical decision to keep the ultra radicals at bay. Both underscore a natural desire to play the terror card.

House of terror: Pakistan authorities had repeatedly denied Osama's
presence in their country, even as he lived a short distance away from
the country's capital.

Pakistan is to try Dr Afridi, who is suspected to have given information to the US, which led to the famous SEAL assault on May 2 and the subsequent death of Osama. Is it treason to help the US find the world's most wanted terrorist? It was rather a service that he did to the US and the world. Yet, the attitude is that not helping the US find Osama was an act of supreme loyalty by the ISI and the Pakistan Army.

These are unfortunate directions Pakistan is taking, egged on by an increasingly intolerant section that is strident, violent, and at times vicious. Just looking at photographs of thousands of Islamists protesting against the sentencing of Salman Taseer's killer, juxtaposed with the news that 13 innocent Shias were taken off a bus, lined and killed in cold blood by Sunni radicals, has a chilling effect. It is not that radicalism spreads in one massive tsunami. It creeps in slowly and all it takes is a few good men to keep quiet for the virus to spread. It happens when a small child is accused of blasphemy for misspelling, when Ahmedi children are banned from attending school, or when religious laws that discriminate against women are espoused.

Why is it that Pakistan chooses to behave in a manner that has made it an international pariah with a broken economy and a rundown social structure that can't give its young the gift of modern education, but subjects them to the medieval obscurantism of many madrassas? Soon after its birth, Pakistan was naturally anxious to make its formation a success. Its mistake was to perennially seek equality with India. Since then it has boxed above its weight. It decided to play its locational card with the West. It offered its territory for US Cold War objectives, then for the Afghan jihad and then again, ostensibly against terrorism. Pakistan's leaders also learnt that delinquency could be rewarding, so they either played the victim or spread terror, assured protection by the country's status as a nuclear power.

The West, especially the US has continued its policy of coddling Pakistan. What were considered startling accusations by the outgoing American Chief of Joint Staff Admiral Mullen 10 days ago, are already being watered down. True, there are many Pakistani men and women who shudder at the direction their country is taking. It is also true that there are far more in Pakistan who believe in the ideology of the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba that promises ultimate and global Islamic dominance.

The only thing they dislike is violence against Pakistanis. The main worry in India is not that Pakistan will use the nuclear bomb; the main worry is that it will continue to use militias like the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba as a veritable arm of the Pakistan Army whose own motto is 'jihad f'isb illah' (jihad in the name of Allah). Our fear should be that hordes of militant believers could be let loose by their mentors. If a country's rulers can be duplicitous with their benefactor there is very little reason to believe they will not do likewise or worse with their 'sworn enemy'.

The writer is former chief of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)
Mid-day October 13, 2011, Mumbai

2011-10-06T08:04:00.000+05:30

HAVE WE LEARNT ANY LESSONS

Whenever there is a terrorist incident in India we hear the same rhetoric and promises. The same repetitive promises to root out terrorism, about zero tolerance, promises of compensations to those killed or wounded, gory pictures on front pages, excited TV channels in competition to cover the horror in detail (just what the terrorist wants), experts’ panels on all channels showering wisdom, VIP visits to the scene throwing all other arrangements out of gear, politicians seeking vote banks and allegations of intelligence failure in a trial on the camera. That is until the next terrorist incident.
Terrorism or terrorist acts are about murder and killing innocents in pursuance to causes real, contrived or imagined, and counter terrorism can get ugly because there is no polite way of dealing with those willing to kill innocents or themselves. Further, terrorism is a cost effective weapon and the state response has to be cost-intensive and manpower intensive to the nth degree. In addition there are hidden costs calculated by Levitt and Dubner in their book Super Freakonomics. Even though the shoe bomber Richard Reid failed in his attempt, this forced the US authorities to introduce the practice of passengers having to remove shoes for inspection at airports. Levitt and Dubner calculated that this meant the loss of time equivalence of 14 lives per year in America.
Terrorism evolves and terrorists innovate as they have moved from individual acts of terror, hostage taking, IED attacks, suicide terrorism, attacks by assault teams of terrorists and then cyber terrorism and catastrophic terrorism. They have used all forms of terrorism as vehicles of their attacks, except naval/sea craft; the counter terrorist is worried about WMD terrorism. Yet whatever be the provocation, democratic governments are expected to react to terrorism with sensitivity to the cause and with determination to eliminate violence. In addition, the counter terrorist lumbers along circumscribed by its own principles of propriety and floundering in the massive bureaucratic labyrinth. Consequently nothing ever gets done, either adequately or in time.
What is wrong with us? Why is it that after 60 years we have not been able to root out terrorism or prevent terrorist attacks? What is it that we, as a country, as a people and as a government must do to rid ourselves of this problem and have failed to do all these years? Is it a lack of political will? Is it a poor set of priorities? It is true we cannot compare the Indian situation with the US or even Europe. The US does not have a neighbour like ours and we live in a tough neighbourhood.
Usually, the lament is that the state should be addressing the causes and grievances first. These require deeper and philosophical handling but the solution to the problem of acts of terrorism and their prevention lie in solving the problems themselves.
Despite the best intelligence and counter terror organisations terrorist attacks can take place simply because the terrorists got lucky . Normally, an individual terrorist attack is successful because of poor intelligence, inadequate and poor policing, imperfect communications. It is not enough that individual terrorist attacks be countered but the phenomenon has to be defeated, made at least costly, if not impossible, for the terrorist and his mentors.
In India, after every crisis the tendency has been to create new super-bodies to oversee existing ones or share their work, achieved mostly by cannibalising the older agencies. Today we have the existing intelligence agencies, the Intelligence Bureau and the Research and Analysis Wing at the centre, supported by state structures. Add to this the Multi Agency Centre superseded by the National Counter Terrorism Centre assisted, supervised or coordinated by the top heavy cost intensive gargantuan National Intelligence Grid. Yet the NATGRID is only intended to be a gigantic clearing house of different data banks without any commensurate downstream arrangements. The National Investigation Agency is designed to investigate post event acts and is not a preventive mechanism and it seems in clash with state agencies who are expected to have better local intelligence.
It is true that sound and timely intelligence is the starting point of an effective counter intelligence effort. Maybe an improvement in HUMINT requires changed recruitment and training systems and revised policies for mid career corrections. We seem to have followed the US pattern in excessive reliance on TECHINT but there is no short cut to having sound HUMINT. Technology is a service an enabler not the main instrument of intelligence operations.
Action on the data accessed from NATGRID would be taken by the local police force. The poor state of these forces is common knowledge. The state police forces are hopelessly undermanned undertrained and under equipped. An all India average of policemen per 100000 people is 125 against the global average of 250. The country is deficit in police recruitment to about 2 million; this is in a country that has no shortage of manpower. The system of the beat constable is now dead and gone because either he is deployed on VIP security or busy pandering to the mafioso who owns the kholi in which he lives. There is thus very little possibility that this poor constable (admittedly no angel most of the time) can carry out his duties diligently.
Counter terrorism cannot be communalised or politicised with terrorism defined in terms of Hindu or Muslim origins. This not only affects investigations but also the communities. There is an enthusiastic attempt in the aftermath of a terrorist incident to acquire political capital. This is something we will have to live with but good ground intelligence and a reasonable data bank (not the overpowering kind imagined by the NATGRID) would help in keeping the counter terror effort as a neutral force.
There is also a feeling that there is very little awareness among the security personnel, both men and officers, about the changing dynamics of global terrorism, the impact of internet, the consequences of AfPak situation on India. There is little awareness about the way Indian terrorist/extremist groups have been evolving in the past ten years and their linkages with other insurgent/extremist/criminal groups operating across borders.
There is little interaction between the state agencies and think-tank community on issues of terrorism and violence. It is time that the state outsourced this expertise as it does not have the time or the manpower to handle this. The state could benefit from understanding the dynamics of terrorism, objectives and support bases of terrorist groups and the extent of state sponsorship of terrorism.
Repeats of terrorist attacks depend upon the efficacy and force of reactions of the state to each terrorist act. One is not sure if there have been adequate lessons learnt apart from constituting new organisations. The state must have and be seen to have, a quick and massive response capability, hostage negotiating and rescue capability, locally trained counter terrorist teams, well organised emergency responses (fire and hospitals) and an effective information management. All these were inadequate in during the Mumbai massacre and the most frequently heard comment was “paralysis” and “chaos”. One can only hope that we have learnt our lessons and this is not repeated the next time an attack occurs which one is reasonably sure will happen.

Mail Today New Delhi October 6, 2011

Have We Learnt Any Lessons?

2011-10-06T08:02:00.002+05:30

China does some chest thumping

2011-09-23T12:25:00.005+05:30

China’s rulers have a problem. They are not sure if they can continue to portray the image of a country interested in a peaceful rise without this coming into direct conflict with a desire to reassert newly defined core interests. All of 2010 saw a more assertive Chinese foreign policy activity in its periphery, including India, reflecting possibly a tussle of some sorts in Beijing between an assertive People’s Liberation Army (PLA) which may want a bigger role in foreign policy in the decade ahead, and a political leadership that is now going to be in transition as Mr Hu Jintao prepares to hand over power to his selected successor, Xi Jinping, by 2012? And therefore this exercise of display of assertiveness with each power centre, notably the PLA and the Party hierarchy, positioning themselves inside China and positioning themselves against the US where there will be presidential elections in end-2012.

China’s assertiveness and the recent reactions in the Chinese media to the visit of the Indian ship INS Airavat is only a reassertion of its position. China had taken umbrage at US secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s July 2010 remarks in Hanoi on creating an international mechanism to resolve this issue, has been particularly visible in the past few weeks. Earlier Dai Bingguo conveyed to Ms Clinton in May 2010 that China regarded its claims to the South China Sea as a core national interest.

The Chinese carried out a live ammunition PLA Navy exercise in the South China Sea on July 26, 2010 followed by another exercise on August 3 along the Yellow Sea coast — the other area of contention. The Chinese conducted exercises there in April and June this year, and were now asserting that China opposed any foreign ships entering the sea or adjacent waters; they even vehemently opposed joint US-South Korean exercises there.

The message in these demarches to the US was in keeping with protecting China’s core interests in the adjacent seas and telling the US that the western Pacific was China’s sphere of interest and influence. It suggested a division of zones of influence between the Eastern and Western Pacific. The US and China have their own geostrategic rivalries to settle, and the Chinese may have assessed that their moment has come.

Its reaction to the visit of the Indian ship has to be seen in this context – it is part belief in its history, part knee jerk, part bullying, part worry about energy resources, and part suspicion about growing India-Vietnamese-US triangular relationship in the South China Sea. The influential Communist Party-managed newspaper the Global Times was somewhat hysterical when, in its editorial of September 16, it warned India that any deal with Vietnam would be ‘serious political provocation’ which could ‘push China to the limit’ and described the ONGC Vietnam deal as a reflection of Indian ambitions. The newspaper went on to say that while China was sincere about its peaceful rise it will not give up its right to use other means to protect its interest. China cherished its friendship with India but this did not mean that China valued this above all else. It referred to India’s intervention in the Dalai Lama issue and ends with the warning that ‘we should not leave the world with the impression that China is only focused on economic development nor should we pursue the reputation of being a peaceful power,’... Clearly, there is a debate inside the sanctum sanctorum of the Chinese Communist Party.

China’s reaction is also a reflection of its concern for energy resources. China has only 1.1% of the world’s known energy reserves but consumes 10.4 % of the world’s oil production and 20.1 % of the total energy consumption in the world. The mismatch is obvious and will grow more in the years ahead. Naturally, China views the disputed South China Sea zone with its energy reserves with special interest. Some estimates state that the known reserves of the South China Sea are twice as much as China’s reserves of oil and there is plenty of gas too.

The Indian reaction to this charge by Beijing has been firm pointing out that India’s cooperation with Vietnam or with any other country ‘is always as per international laws, norms and conventions...’ India has also pointed out China’s role in the disputed part of POK under Pakistan occupation where China may be on the verge of using the territory for developing communication links with Afghanistan. Obviously, China is planning for a post-US phase in Afghanistan, access to its mineral resources, ultimately linking to Iran and the Gulf; it would not want the region to be solely India’s sphere of influence. India has also to keep its own vulnerabilities in Arunachal Pradesh in mind; even though outright war is unlikely we should expect economic cooperation and periodic tensions. China-India relations will not be determined by strict bilateral terms. As both countries rise, there will be competition in other spheres - for markets, resources and influence.

Yet China remains concerned with its intricate trade and financial links with the US, and also with the security of its trade and supply routes that transit the Malacca Straits. It has endeavoured to develop extensive land routes through Central Asia, but these are inadequate. It is a matter of time before China will make its presence more visible in the Indian Ocean. It has port facilities in Kyaukpyu, Hambantota and Gwadar, and a presence in the Arabian Sea as it battles Somali pirates. China has expanded its contacts with Iran and has developed strong ties with Burma.

It is of course entirely feasible that China would have reacted in this manner even if there were not the question of energy reserves of South China Sea. It would have had more to do with its own perception as zhongguo – the “Middle Kingdom” or the “Central Country” where the neighbouring countries were considered to be vassal states and who accepted the Emperor in Beijing as the supreme power in the region.

Thus while New Delhi agonises over challenges across land frontiers, ignoring the new challenge in the Indian Ocean would be extremely hurt Indian interests. There is need to plan counter measures in China's periphery from now. Perpetual whining about China's grand designs will not help.

Source : Written for ANI, New Delhi on September 21, 2011

The Jihadi upper cut in Pakistan

2011-09-12T09:33:00.002+05:30

The famous Pakistani bridge player, Zia Mahmood, in his engagingly written book “Bridge My Way” describes the perils of playing this card game in his native Pakistan in 1975. He wrote that a bridge club was opened in Lahore, but it lasted a week because that was how long it took for the religious groups of the area to have it closed. He adds that ‘simply visiting the club was nerve-racking with the constant worry that at any time violent neighbours might turn up with their own brand of eviction notice.’ And this was before General Zia ul Haq turned on the Islamic screws on the people. 35 years and more later, we hear of stories about Lahore’s growing Talibanisation when the woman curator of the city’s famous Nairang Gallery was harassed and assaulted by a senior police official for wearing improper clothes and describing the work of the Gallery as fahashi (vulgarity) during the rehearsal of a Bharatnatyam dance recital; the same moral brigade representative had earlier objected to a couple because they were sitting together. Those who tried to rescue the curator were beaten and when gallery owner’s son enquired about the incident, he was dragged away to the thana for being ‘hung upside down’. This cultural policing is a sign of what is clearly becoming the new ideology of Pakistan.

The assassination of Punjab Governor, Salman Taseer in January this year, by his own body guard because he opposed the Blasphemy Law is one part of the problem. All societies have such intolerant elements but what is worrying has been the reaction of the mullahs, the lawyers and even the state. There was reluctance to blame Mumtaz Qadri, the assassin, instead there was praise for his action. The state clearly indicated that it was not going to revise the Blasphemy Law. Perhaps it was not going to be able to revise or did not want to revise; one will never know.

Pakistan’s well-known political analyst and commentator, Dr Eqbal Ahmed had prophesied as far back as in 1998 in the Dawn newspaper (August 23,) that the costs of Islamabad’s Afghan policy— already unbearable in proliferation of guns, heroin and armed fanatics — would multiply in myriad ways. He had added that closeness with the Taliban would make these costs potentially catastrophic. Today, in this pursuit of strategic depth and seeking to avenge India for all the various imagined wrong doings, Pakistan’s rulers have become impervious to the logic of peace; only the logic of force is understood, inside Pakistan or in its neighbourood. Neither the Islam of the Taliban or the Lashkar e Tayyaba favours democracy; nor does the Pakistan Army.

Although Zia had been credited with the drive towards enforcing austere Islam, political leaders in Pakistan have also succumbed to pressure from religious forces or used religion for political ends. It might even be argued that had Zia or his successors been wiser they could have offered to wind down the jihad and its mujahideen, in return for largesse of all kinds from the Americans and the west, used it well and Pakistan today could have been a prosperous, strong and modernised state in the region, ahead of India perhaps. Instead the rulers retained the jihadi option and clichés of ‘a thousand year war’ and ‘we shall eat grass’ endured through successive governments that came after Zia

There was an inevitability of this process that the Pakistani rulers either did not see or refused to see; or worse, even encouraged this after sometime especially in India during the 1990s. . After years of close association with Islamic militancy either in Afghanistan or in India, Pak Army personnel were directly exposed to Islamic militancy and propaganda for an orthodox Islamic order for Pakistan. The important question today is how much and to what extent has the Pakistan Army been Islamicised and how has this affected the society or the elite which has always sided with the Army. In Pakistan the dilemma is that the society will have to see whether in the long term, the larger political battle is won by those who seek an Islamic theocratic state or by those who want a modern Islamic republic. True there are many brave and liberal thinkers and writers in Pakistan who see the dangers. Their writings appear in the English press frequently. But they also know that once a thinker crosses the rubicon, a fate similar to that of Daniel Pearl or Syed Saleem Shahzad is a strong possibility.

A society that teaches its young hatred for other religions and cultures, only suffocates and blinds them. This is the nature of the Pakistani state today. Those who wish to deal with Pakistan or need to deal with that country would do well to remember this. We cannot change this; only Pakistanis can, if they wish to. Indians just have to learn to deal with the reality.

The world does not stress on the Christianity of western countries while dealing with them. Similarly, one need not stress on Pakistan’s Islamic/Muslim character which is part of its two-nation theory and not India’s. Just deal with Pakistan as another country which would relieve us of having to constantly tailor our policies with our Muslims in mind. Our Muslims are as Indian as the rest of us with the same problems and aspirations and can no longer be treated as vote banks at election time.

Source : 12th September 2011

INTELLIGENCE – HOW NOT TO REFORM

2011-08-07T11:51:00.000+05:30

Traditionally, intelligence reforms in India have had two main characteristics. They have been episodic and have been carried out by the government, either through appointed committees or in house. The 1962 conflict with China was followed by the creation of new organizations like the ARC, the SSB and so on. The 1965 war with Pakistan and the Mizo insurgency led to the creation of R&AW. The Kargil conflict in 1999 led to the creation of the NTRO and DIA as recommended by the Intelligence Review Committee which was headed by former Governor and head of R&AW G C Saxena. Post Mumbai 2008, we have the NCTC and the National Intelligence Grid on the anvil. In house reviews have had limited mandates and were really cadre reviews. There has never been any reform which takes the long term security perspective and then work out what kind of an intelligence system would be required to meet such needs.
It is therefore refreshing to see that think tanks based in New Delhi have begun to examine this important matter and presumably their recommendations will reach the Government. This is a limited way of the outside looking in. The danger of course is that these exercises can be academic for instance, a comparison of intelligence supervision practices in Australia, New Zealand or Canada to act as some of the role models for what India should adopt would be misplaced. The security risks in these countries, the size of their population and its demographic mix and their neighbourhood are totally different. We have to evolve our own systems and not just copy other systems.
The discourse that seems to be current gives the impression that while the subject is intelligence reform the examples cited relate to the R&AW. Besides intelligence reforms have to be examined in their totality, including all intelligence services – IB, DIA, MI, NTRO (which remained headless for over five months, a reflection of the Government’s attitude towards intelligence organisations), and not restricting its review to one organisation. This needs to be corrected.
Intelligence is not available at the flick of a button. We all know that Intelligence networks are built in the fullness of time and not when the crisis is upon us. Development of an intelligence report is a painstaking effort requiring expertise of different kinds which includes humint and techint of different kinds. This has to be backed by area, language subject expertise built over a long time. It takes five to ten years to inculcate expertise in a young recruit at the junior level; there is no overnight expertise. Recruitment has to be at a young age so that he or she can be molded and before attitudes and mind sets firm up or the recruit is just too old to take chances in the field. Only this gives an intelligence officer the ability to analyse and assess. Operational intelligence requires different expertise and aptitudes. An intelligence agency must continue to have covert and psy-war capabilities which have long gestations cannot be empirically measured but have to be consistently pursued and continuously honed.
Any reform must examine the kind of human capabilities that will be required in the future, whether the existing pattern of recruitment and compensation is adequate today and will remain so in the times ahead. There has to be system that ensures the organisation continues to get the appropriate kind of human material that form the core of the organisation and the agency also has access to external expertise from time to time. It needs to look at the system of control and management and whether the secretariat system has been good for the organisations where career prospects are linked to career prospects outside the organisation and not within. Since intelligence agencies are specialised agencies and do not compete with general appointments they should have their own stream of career progression independent of the career paths in the rest of the civil service.
We live in a world that is seeing rapidly changing threat perceptions. Intelligence agencies have to be flexible to meet any evolving threat. At present there is hardly any surge capability where the agency can, on its own, shift manpower and resources to meet the new threat. The process that exists today is far too cumbersome and slow to allow any rapid redeployment. By the time any new system is put into place the quarry has moved on, either morphed into something different or has just become too big so that the changes originally proposed become inadequate. The head of an intelligence organisation must have the flexibility and authority to move men and material around. One cannot think of annual reviews of performance if the process of obtaining sanctions for even relocating manpower and acquiring additional equipment ranging that is governed by persons removed from the scene of action.
There cannot be accountability without a charter for the intelligence organisations and the empowerment of their Heads. Only when there is a legal charter accompanied by powers vested in the man leading the organisation to deliver the results can one think of accountability. Empowerment, trust and charter go hand in hand. Otherwise we will end up creating new power centres and vested interests that will act as a deterrent to the organisation and not serve any purpose. In our zeal to control and supervise we run the danger of creating multiple controls and stifle intelligence organisations. It would somewhat be like the Russian Babushka dolls – symbolic and very decorative but of little practical use. At least the dolls have some purpose; in the context of security multiplicity of organisations under multiple scrutiny would only hamstring the agencies. They will continue to be unable to deliver to the degree required or even worse, fail.
Merely stressing on accountability and oversight would be misplaced. This is perhaps based on the impression that Intelligence is generally considered evil because it is secret, therefore it must be controlled. This leads to the bizarre expectation among some wise people that intelligence agencies and their collection methods should be made transparent. In this context, intelligence agencies have to be protected against disclosures of locations of facilities, names of officers and personnel and other sensitive details that would help the adversary and harm the conduct of operations as well as security of the country.
So while oversight and co-ordination are good catchphrases the point is by who and to what extent. We thus have to be careful here and not follow the western example where the experience has been different. There too multiple controls have not been an unmitigated success and co-ordination among multiple agencies remains a problem despite all intentions. Intelligence agencies work best under a single chain of command and multiplicity of controls and supervisory agencies leads to confusion. They work even better when the Chief Executive of a country takes an active interest in their output and their well being.
There is a suggestion that operational details or secret service funds be subjected to external scrutiny. This means that there has to be scrutiny of the intelligence operations and sources by external agencies/bodies. This is absolutely unthinkable.
While trying to improve the inner working of intelligence agencies it would be dangerous adopt the human rights approach. Intelligence agencies in an autocratic regime act to preserve that autocracy. In a democracy they act to preserve democracy and the nation. But intelligence agencies cannot themselves practice democracy or human rights. It is not in the nature of their working ethos. The ideal among some is to have an intelligence agency that is as hard as nails on the outside and soft as chocolate from the inside. RTIs and PILs are best discouraged unless we are determined to expose all our working methods to those against whom these resources are used. This cannot be.
There are a few other misconceptions in the average person. Intelligence agencies do not conduct rescue operations of hostages nor do they make policies in democratic countries and nor should they. They only provide inputs but the ultimate decision to negotiate and the mandate of the negotiators is determined by political considerations. Intelligence agencies become all powerful in autocratic and military regimes, e.g. the Soviet Union, Egypt, Pakistan and others. In situations where the ‘civil society’ is concerned with the functioning of intelligence agencies surely there has to be a quid pro quo for the civil society toward intelligence agencies.
It would be unrealistic to state that intelligence agencies do not have their shortcomings, but they are not all of their own making. The rest of us have contributed by either being indiscreet, indifferent or even hostile. It is true that on occasions intelligence agencies have failed to deliver and that unfortunately is by what they are known – their failures. Their successes are left untold except to those who need to know.
Reform is essential in society and its instruments of governance. To deny this would be to live in bigotry. But there have to be some yardsticks to judge whether or not the reforms will abide and improve what they set out to do. The reform process must begin with empathy that seeks to improve and not suspicion that seeks to control.
A full and comprehensive review must therefore look ahead and assess the perceived threats to the country and then recommend what kind of an intelligence agency would best serve the security and national interests of the country in the next 15-20 years. Simultaneously, the Head of the Organisation should be empowered to act to fulfill that charter. This means he must have the authority to hire and fire experts, fast track and discard, have the capacity to surge his deployment according to security needs and not be dependent on the wisdom or lack of it in some other corner of the government. The review should ideally address the needs of an organization in respect of personnel, materials and resources for the future. This should address the specialised needs of an organisation with different skill sets. If it merely concentrates on chopping and controlling, it is destined to fail.
Writing for the Indian Defence Review for their March 2009 issue, I had begun with the following quote from Sun Tzu’s famous treatise The Art of War
‘Nothing should be as favourably regarded as intelligence; nothing should be as generously rewarded as intelligence; nothing should be as confidential as the work of intelligence.’
This remains valid for modern day statecraft as well.
This is an article I wrote for Hard News, New Delhi. They carried it in one of their subsequent issues April 10, 2011.

L'affaire Afridi

2011-04-04T21:38:00.002+05:30

L’affaire Afridi

Let us not deceive ourselves. There has been an element of politics in sport from the days of the Grecian Olympics and the Roman Empire. The marathon race has a military origin; the gladiators in Rome fought to the death in front of nobles that the Caesar would get together in an exhibition of strength. The British Empire was built on playing fields of Eton. Much later, Hitler was obnoxious at the Berlin Olympics in 1936, when he refused to hand over the medal to Jesse Owens; the South Africans practiced apartheid even in sport. The US led a boycott of the Moscow Olympics in 1980 and the Eastern Bloc retaliated at the Los Angeles games in 1984. There is macho sub-nationalism in the Scotland-England soccer matches and to a larger extent in the Ashes series. We ourselves have been practicing cricket diplomacy since 1977. Besides, the status of India Pakistan relations being what they are, let us not pretend that cricket matches between the two countries are just that.

Shahid Afridi made a brave attempt to try to keep politics out of the game when at the end of the India Pakistan semi-final match he spoke with dignity and grace. India cheered him. He went a step further upon returning to Pakistan when he admonished the press corps for injecting politics into the game. Those of us who saw the interview applauded him again. Twenty four hours later he recanted to Samaa TV. It was no longer about cricket, Afridi had injected Allah into the game and pronounced that Pakistan and India could never be friends. Yet ultimately this was not about Afridi the man said but the circumstances that made his say this.

This reaction was possibly to Gautam Gambhir’s silly comment that he dedicated the Indian victory to Mumbai 26/11. This meant terrorism, which meant Lashkar e Tayyaba which ultimately meant Hafeez Saeed. This was not going to be acceptable to some in Pakistan. Since then there has been a hyper twitter and a hyper Pak press with churlish articles being churned out by the likes of retired Air Vice Marshall and former Ambassador Shahzad Choudhry accusing India of cheating and worse, scoffing at Sachin Tendulkar. This is in poor taste and one can only draw the conclusion that Pakistan makes a poor loser. Besides, it was Pak Interior Minister Rehman Malik who led a maladroit charge against his own team when he warned them against match fixing. Naturally any media would latch on to this, especially in a high voltage encounter that was going to take place.

It was not about good or bad media coverage. All host countries including Pakistan play these games. Come to think of it was Afridi who targeted Sachin Tendulkar prior to the match in an interview. This is perfectly acceptable in these days of gamesmanship and media blitzkreig. It was not about Afridi but the circumstances that made his say this. He is now caught in a cleft stick. If he says that he made these comments of his own volition then this makes him a bigot. If he admits that he was forced to make this comment then it only proves that the same hidden power that killed Salman Taseer and prevented any fateha from being read for him or the Pakistan Parliament from condemning the killing and honoured the assassin, increasingly and ominously rules the roost. Obviously, Afridi will never be able to say he was forced to make this statement.

This is Pakistan’s problem, but this is an ominous trend because it is not only threatening Pakistan’s liberal section but has now begun to attack even the Father of the Taliban, Maulana Fazlur Rehman with two assassination bids. It is the same mindset that is on the rampage when three bomb blasts killed 40 innocents in the attack on the Sufi Sakhi Sarwar shrine near Dera Ghazi Khan in southern Punjab on April 3.

One does not have to be Hindutva follower or a right wing extremist to say this, nor is this wishful thinking, but the truth is that Pakistan is in deep trouble internally today. The country’s weakened liberal society is slipping into the Pastor Martin Neimoller syndrome (“Then they came for me and there was no one left to speak out for me”) as the Nazis rose to power in Germany with all its consequences.
It is fashionable to remain in denial but to Afridi’s gratuitous remark that ‘their’ (Indian) hearts are different from ‘ours’ (Muslim and Pakistani) all one can say is – “Thank God”

Afghanistan - What Went Wrong and What Comes Next

2011-04-02T11:14:00.007+05:30

The increasingly prevalent view, although not officially articulated inside the Washington DC Beltway, is that the Afghan war seems militarily unwinnable and politically uncertain. The choice now is not about winning and leaving but to select from some very poor options after the US has been involved in its longest overseas military engagement. By 2014, it will have run into its thirteenth year.

Admiral Mike Mullen recently warned that 2011 would be bloodier than 2010 and at the current rate of loss another 1,500 young men and women will die by 2014. The US treasury will have spent another $ 600 billion by then. Other parameters do not look healthy either. The primary aim of the US in the Afghan theatre is to make America safe from terrorist attacks emanating from Afghanistan. European and American public opinion is swinging away from this war and the Europeans are anxious to leave. There is little possibility that by 2014 either the Afghan National Army or the Afghan National Police will be ready to take over the responsibility of ensuring Afghanistan's security and law and order across the country. The United States is looking at a strategic stalemate.

Following recent upheavals in the Middle East, US policy makers are anxiously watching the entire region, from the Maghreb to the Saudi Peninsula and even Iran and Pakistan. The replacement of regimes in the Middle East may not all result in US-friendly governments given the undertones of both the anti-American sentiment and Islamic fervour in these regions. In the early days of the 21st century, where power equations are changing and there is intense discussion of the implications of the rise of China and its interests in the Middle East, this must be a matter of additional concern in Washington.

The region is energyrich and also home to some of the most radical Islamist movements that arise from the Afghanistan-Pakistan (AfPak) region as well from the Middle East. US interests in Afghanistan have come under increasing stress in recent weeks over the Raymond Davis affair. America’s most important ally in the region, Pakistan, is witnessing another round of increasingly vocal anti-American sentiment amidst growing sectarianism, violence and instability. US patience with Pakistan is running low and the cancellation of the US-Afghanistan-Pakistan trilateral is a direct result of this impasse on the Davis issue.

Today, the entire region from the Oxus to the Indus has become extremely unstable with an unending wave of Pushtun-led violence in Northern Pakistan and in the Punjab province. This does little to help the execution of a complicated and a difficult war against an elusive enemy in an environment sullied by acute mistrust between the US and Pakistan.

The war against terrorism was well begun in Afghanistan in 2001, but it quickly ran aground because of changed priorities. Consequently, it became a wrong war in the wrong place impeded by an unreliable ally. With inadequate boots on the ground no amount of aerial attacks was going to provide the ability to clear and hold territory so essential in a counter insurgency campaign. Inexplicably, US policies have been more of the same; a paucity of ideas that believes in funneling more funds to Pakistan either as a reward for services believed rendered or in the hope that they will rendered. In the process, Pakistan has acquired a veto power over US policies in AfPak. Since the US considered Pakistan to be part of the solution rather than the problem, Pakistan became an indispensible ally even as it pursued a course directly contradictory to US and NATO – even global - goals in the region. If there has to be any attribution to reasons of failure, this American inability or unwillingness to understand Pakistan’s strategic ambitions and attitudes would be the most crucial factor responsible for the present US position in AfPak.

The predicament is that the US cannot permanently maintain the present force level, the casualty rate or the cost of the war. It also does not thus have the luxury of time to put together a viable local alternative. Departure from an unsettled region will only lead to further instability and a conceivable civil war reopening old animosities between the largely Pushtun south and east against the other minorities – the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. A prolonged conflict in the region seems the more likely course. Intervention by outside interests in Afghanistan will inevitably follow.

It is sometimes forgotten that in the ultimate analysis, the Taliban are Pushtun who live on both sides of the Durand Line which was a demarcation made due to British imperial interests of the time. These interests divided the Pushtun between Afghanistan and the North West Frontier Province under British control. In recent years there has been an upsurge in anti-Pushtun violence in the Balochistan province of Pakistan, in Karachi, the country’s largest city and in FATA, which has seen repeated US attacks. It may not be long before there is an upsurge of a demand for Greater Pushtunistan once the foreigner and therefore common enemy has departed and the Pushtuns internalise their several problems swept under the carpet by preceding regimes. Pushtun assertiveness will almost certainly lead to retaliation from Afghanistan’s other ethnic groups. Religious obscurantism combined with ultra-nationalism can be a very explosive mix. Of course, given Afghanistan’s complex tribal structure it is not easy to predict the future. Most certainly, however, any change in the configuration of the Pushtun belt will have its repercussions on Pakistan. Faced with limited options, it might be considered a satisfactory, if not a good solution, for Washington DC to be able to come to an agreement with the ‘good’ Taliban assuming that: they exist, they are less fundamentalist and they are therefore more benign than other parts of the Taliban. The war in Afghanistan was not just against the Taliban and the Al Qaeda but against the medieval obscurantism that they represent. Today, one discerns dialogue in the west that seems to suggest that the Taliban are not such bad fellows after all; they have a regional (i.e. Afghan nationalist) approach and are merely fighting against foreign occupation. The implication is that once this cause disappears then the Taliban angst will disappear and Afghanistan can be left to them. This is a dangerous rationalisation and does not take into account Pakistani ambitions, the Taliban/Al Qaeda combine or the criminal narcotics-warlord nexus. Accepting this deal is accepting the mindset and the short route to rapid Islamisation of the region and beyond.

A solution can be possible only if four aspects are seriously considered. Pakistan must be reined in and made to understand that it is less indispensible to US interests than it makes out. The US must accept that it can no longer determine the fate of other countries on its own and has to reach out to other neighbouring countries like Iran and others who have important stakes in the stability and independence of Afghanistan (i.e. Russia and India). Additionally, the US has to use more of the stick and less of the carrot when dealing with Pakistan. The narcotics criminal warlord nexus must be severed. This cannot be done without adequate agricultural relief work and pacification of Kandahar, where the challenge is greatest. To deal with Afghanistan effectively, there has to be closer US and NATO engagement with Russia and separately with Iran, however unpalatable it might appear today. We must evaluate if there can be any agreement amongst all nations about non-interference in Afghanistan and whether will Pakistan continue to remain a considerable part of the problem. Whatever happens in the next few years, it must be accepted that the nature of the region will change, perhaps forever. A stable Pakistan may have been able to exercise reasonable influence on a much weaker Afghanistan. However, Pakistan is itself in a mess of various kinds, where one hears increasingly intolerant and violent religiosity with ethno-political fissures. It is doubtful whether Pakistan would be able to either control or bring stability to the region. Pakistan’s quest for strategic depth is more likely to end up as a strategic quagmire. What we are looking at is a very unstable and turbulent region.

Given that more troops cannot be committed, funds may be in short supply and that the discourse in the US and the West has changed, what are US options? How does one define ‘Mission Accomplished’ when all of the options are poor or even impossible?

Perhaps Vice President Joe Biden’s plan is effective: withdrawal of ground forces substantially and then hunting Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan using special forces, Predator missile attacks and other surgical tactics. Ambassador Robert Blackwill’s Plan B for Afghanistan is really an extension of this. He suggests a withdrawal of American forces substantially from the Pushtun south and east and a concentration of US forces in the north and northwest as bases for striking against targets.

Blackwill’s plan leaves some sizeable forces in the region protecting American interests though it also means an admission that the war as presently configured is unwinnable. Within this plan is dialogue with the Taliban, reduction of US dependency on Pakistan and an informal coming into being of a Pushtun homeland. Both Biden and Blackwill realise that the essential problem is in Pakistan. Any amount of readjustment or reevaluation of US policies and priorities in Afghanistan will not succeed unless there is a similar reevaluation of its policies and priorities in Pakistan.

Source : Washington DC based journal – Fair Observer , March 29, 2011. Fair Observer can be accessed at http://blog.fairobserver.com/.

Put Siachen in the Table last , Not first

2011-04-01T11:34:00.003+05:30

As the US gets into an Arab quagmire without extricating itself from the AfPak theatre there must also be pressure to find a foreign policy success in Washington DC, with election year approaching. Consequently, the discourse on AfPak has begun to change. The good and necessary war has become unnecessary and futile as it drains the US treasury and America suffers 500 casualties annually. Western experts and media now describe how unstable the situation in Pakistan has become and how radicalised that country is today. There is also grudging admission that Pakistan’s rulers have been following a dual if not a multilayered policy on hunting with the US in the effort in Afghanistan and supping with the terrorists of various hues simultaneously both on the western and eastern frontiers. Simultaneously, the subscript is getting more pronounced.

This subscript says that Pakistan is unable to fully co-operate because of its apprehension about Indian designs on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Almost all of the recent writings from the US or the UK – end up with the same final recommendation. India and Pakistan must sort themselves out on issues like Kashmir to enable Pakistan to stabilise and become a true ally to the US. The kind of gentle persuasion that was alluded to in the Wikileaks cables, must surely be continuing. India-Pakistan talks have recommenced and another dramatic but eventually pointless gesture to inconsequential entities has been made.

Recent writings from Pakistan suggest that among the issues that are considered easily solvable is the Saltoro Ridge (commonly referred to as the Siachin glacier) and the UN is being inveigled into this. This is not so and anyone who sees the map of the region will understand this. Undoubtedly peace with Pakistan is desirable. However, to try and attain it through magnanimity will only trump realism.

The reality is that India-Pakistan level of distrust remains very high despite the efforts of some dream merchants. Pakistan has not called an unequivocal and permanent end to using its jehadist weapon in India and it never will; its prevarication on issues related to investigation in the Mumbai 2008 terrorist attack is the sum and substance of this attitude.

The Indian Army climbed to the Saltoro Ridge in 1984 to cut off Pakistan’s plans to access beyond Saltoro to the Karakoram Pass. This would have enabled Pakistan access to Tibet and also threaten Ladakh. Pakistan and China would have access to each other through the Khunjerab Pass on the Karakoram Highway via Xinjiang and to Tibet through the Karakoram Pass. The Saltoro Ridge provided Indian forces with strategic heights looking into Pak-occupied Gilgit and Baltistan. Such an advantage must not be given up for some obscure short-term political gain without a document to establish one’s credentials.

Pakistan’s unwillingness to sign any document that authenticates the Agreed Ground Position Line (AGPL) could only mean that it would seek to break it at first dawn. There is neither a change of heart nor intentions. Kargil 1999 was the latest, and probably not the last, military attempt to alter the ground position in Kashmir in an effort to negate the advantage India had in Saltoro.

In recent years the geopolitical situation has changed. There is greater Chinese presence in Gilgit and Baltistan where apart from building other facilities the Chinese have been upgrading the Karakoram Highway since 2005. It is estimated that last August about 11000 Chinese were involved in infrastructure projects like the construction of dams, roads and bridges, dozens of tunnels and a high speed rail link. This would ultimately link with the Chinese aided port project at Gwadar shortening China’s route to the Persian Gulf from four weeks to 48 hours Simultaneously, the Chinese have been upgrading their own infrastructure in Xinjiang and Tibet north of the Himalayas.

India has repeatedly given up strategic advantages and conceded on the negotiating table what was won on the battlefield. In 1948, when the Pakistani forces were retreating, we did not secure Muzaffarabad, Bagh, Kotli or Skardu. In 1966, we gave up Haji Pir, through which infiltrators keep coming into the Kashmir Valley even today. In 1972, we gave up territory and 93,000 PoWs for an agreement that Pakistan never intended to observe. And now Pakistan continues to drag its feet on the Mumbai 2008 issue.

The only way it would not be perceived as a retreat would be if the Pakistanis first agreed to delineate the AGPL in the Siachin sector, which is a part of the large Saltoro Ridge, authenticate this on maps that would then be signed and exchanged by commanders of the two countries. Pakistan would then project the AGPL in all its maps, making the AGPL an extension of the LoC from Point NJ-9842 that does not go towards the Karakoram Pass but due north along the Saltoro Ridge. After this, the two countries would work out the ground rules for demilitarisation. Only after this has been worked out should there be discussion on redeployment and demilitarisation of this sector. Anything short of this will be a sell-out.

The issue is far too important to be decided furtively or in a hurry. It is only fair that if we are to retreat, the people should know that this pullback is in the national interest. Siachin has to be last issue on the table and not the first one.

Source : Asian Age , 29th March 2011.

Counter-Terrorism: The Indian Experience

2011-03-25T16:34:00.005+05:30

COUNTER TERRORISM IN SOUTH ASIA

A JOINT PUBLICATION

BY HERITAGE FOUNDATION, WASHINGTO DC

AND

OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, NEW DELHI.

The Heritage Foundation, Washington DC and the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi had organised a conference on US and Indian experiences in handling terrorism Asia last year and the result of this was a book “Counter Terrorism in South Asia” which was released by Dr Shashi Tharoor, MP in New Delhi on February 22, 2011. An audio-visual summary of the inauguration can be seen at http://bit.ly/eu6UCt

Speaking at the book release, I had made the following brief observations

Each country understands threats from terrorism according to its own experiences and there is now an understanding in the West that global terrorism can only be fought globally. Both India and the US have a closer understanding today of the problem that emanates from Pakistan and Afghanistan. If the Raymond Davis case illustrates the mindset of those that rule from Rawalpindi, the reaction to the killing of Salman Taseer shows how radicalised Pakistan has become and how weak the country’s liberal society is today. This has been evident to many of us who have watched Pakistan closely in recent years.

So while we understand partially that we can no longer distinguish between my terrorist and your terrorist, nor say my terrorist first, there are still differences on how the problem in Pakistan is to be handled. Ten years of US coddling of Pakistan and we cannot even get Raymond Davis released.

What is often not understood by those who push for talks, is that Pakistan’s hostility towards India is not just about Kashmir, Siachin or water. Hostility has been a doctrine of all regimes, especially the military, hatred is the fuel and jihadi foot soldiers the vehicle, that has been used for regime survival.

Terrorists don’t have to strike every day. The fear that they can and that is can be catastrophic, is a nightmare. The fear is that fissile material in Pakistan could disappear or the suspicion that material for mass extinction could have reached San Diego. For us, this is in our neighbourhood but no country can afford to believe that distance is security.

Counter terrorism is a long hard struggle and cannot be conducted in isolation any more.

Also given are extracts from Chapter 2 of the book which was written by me.

THE PROBLEM BRIEFLY STATED

Terrorism, in its present phase, seems to be about jihadi terrorism in the global context; but for countries like India the kind of threats faced by the state and the people vary from left wing extremism to ethnic separatism to religious causes. Asymmetric warfare as a policy option has been used by weaker states as a force equaliser as has been the case by Pakistan against India for most of the 60 plus years but more particularly so since the 1990s. Policies have to be evolved and capacities built and sustained, improved over time as terrorists innovate for countering this menace.

Very often there is a demand that root causes be addressed to solve the problem of terrorism. This is a mistaken notion as there is no justifiable root cause for killing innocents and there is no reason for trying to distinguish either between my terrorist and yours or asserting that killing of security forces or targeting government institutions and officials is a legitimate course of action in any society.

Terrorism, as a violent manifestation of present day disaffection and disenchantment, in the context of exploding expectations, is something the modern world will have to live with, in the sense that it can never be completely eradicated as new sources of conflict , real or perceived emerge. Ideally it should be prevented but this does not happen because states usually remain in denial till it is too late; the next best desirable objective is to defeat terrorism in a manner that it ceases to be a threat.

The threat that India faces from terrorism differs from the one faced by the US in two essential ways. In India the threats emanate principally on our own territory and there has been massive collusion by our neighbours Pakistan that continues and China in the past. Secondly, because for the US the source of terrorism is essentially thousands of kilometres away and the US has the ability it can strike at the source. In India it is it is believed that it is virtually impossible to resort the principle of hot pursuit for fear of escalation beyond calculation.

Broadly one would describe the various insurgencies and terrorism as follows:

· J&K: Islamist separatist movement that has become extremist with Pakistani assistance

· Punjab: Religious separatism

· North east: Mainly seeking independence with smaller groups seeking autonomy

· Left Wing extremism: As the name implies radical movement spreading across nine major states of India seeking overthrow of democracy to establish extreme left wing rule

Each has needed different policy and strategic options to tackle them.

Although two major terrorist/insurgency threats – Kashmir and spreading outwards to the rest of India (Mumbai for instance) and Left Wing Extremism in Central India, remain, India has successfully tackled other major terrorisms and insurgencies in the past. The notable phenomenon being that in all these it took decades of action to come to a positive conclusion. The Nagaland and Mizoram insurgencies lasted 19 years before being brought under control and had required concerted counter-insurgency operations involving the Army at some stages. The Punjab insurgency which too had external support, lasted 14 years. It was brought under control through effective counter terrorism actions by the state. Left Wing Insurgency, currently in its most virulent phase, has been with us almost from the beginning.

Thus it is clear that insurgencies tend to last for decades and can be controlled through a mixture of offensive counter terrorist methods accompanied by the cutting off foreign assistance – be it shelter, weapons, training and finances. It is a fallacy to assume that terrorism can be controlled by first offering politically expedient palliatives like development assistance without first overpowering the violent phase. Since such movements take decades to be controlled it requires sustained political will to continue with the campaign even when it seemingly looks unwinnable and politically unpopular. The start point of any counter terror policy is obviously a political will to tackle this problem in the face of reverses.

Terrorism has evolved over time and now includes suicide terrorism, maritime terrorism and even airborne terrorism, with the fear of WMD terrorism always present. Surrounded by failed or failing states, India has to contend with hostile policies of Pakistan which are threatening that country itself which increases the fear that faced with its own problems Pakistan will seek a diversion.

It is the sequencing of the counter terrorist actions that is important on the basis of five requirements - detect, deter, destroy and then develop and dialogue. Any attempt to dialogue before a reasonable semblance of the first three steps will be interpreted by the terrorist as appeasement. Therefore, the timing of the last two aspects has to be carefully nuanced.

INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES – AND CO-ORDINATION

This then leads us to the ability to detect acts of terrorism – which means development of a first rate intelligence grid that combines both techint and humint capabilities. Absence of hard data, intelligence and therefore, inadequate follow up invariably leads to inability to prevent a terrorist act or if an act has been committed leads to inexact reactions that causes more grief than it solves. In federal structures such as India’s where law and order is a state subject it is imperative that there be co-ordination between the centre and the states because either the first intelligence information will emanate from the state or would need to be developed and pursued by the state agencies.

Attempts at rejuvenating and reorganising the Intelligence and Security set ups were part of the Kargil Review Committee recommendations. Apart from the creation of a DIA and a dedicated Techint collection facility, the NTRO, we also had the Multi Agency Centre (MAC) for collecting and co-ordinating terrorism –related information from all over India and the Joint Task Force on Intelligence (JTFI) responsible for conveying in real time intelligence information back to the States for action there. However, the implementation of the schemes remained inadequate and did not achieve d the desired goals. Since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks the government has been planning to set up a National Counter Terrorism Centre which is expected o be functional by the end of the year.

However, since the Mumbai attacks had shown up various weaknesses in the CI system, there have been several steps to revitalise the entire CI grid in other way. The MAC referred to earlier has been made functional, there is full online connectivity between the centre and its 30 important subsidiary units in the states; the National Investigation Agency has been established; the strength of the Intelligence Bureau has been augmented, decentralised hubs for the National Security Guards have been established in Mumbai, Chennai, Hyderabad and Kolkota.

In a related development, it is proposed to establish a National Intelligence Grid, where Intelligence organisations like the Intelligence Bureau, National Investigation Agency and the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence will be given access to 20 databases held by public authorities like banks, airlines, railways, insurance companies and immigration and income tax department. The project is ambitious, will have a long gestation period after it is approved, involves intricate systems of co-ordination, the data bases that are there will not cover the entire population, and yet there are bound to be privacy concerns in this regard in India

While the strength of the Central Reserve Police Force will increase from the present 267000 to more than 300000 the Force itself has been stretched greatly with anti-insurgency duties all over the NE, J&K and Central India where it has suffered considerable fatalities in recent months. There have been question marks about the appropriateness of using a force like the CRPF for specialised roles like anti-insurgency. Besides the Force is currently suffering from setbacks, inadequate training and equipment, frequent continued and diverse deployment all of which have affected morale.

It is not just the superstructures that are important. While intelligence co-ordination remains a challenge that each government handles in its own way, in India another problem has been low capacity levels; for instance even if we look at it statistically, India’s military to population ratio is 1:855 while in Pakistan it is 1:255 in China 1:591. Similar adverse statistics prevail for the police force making India one of the most under policed states in the world with an all India average of 125/100000 against the recommended UN figure of 222 and with some countries like the US having a figure of 315. Shortage of law enforcement representatives obviously leads to retreat of the state and the space vacated is taken over by anti state elements.

The tendency, to take shelter by settling ‘root causes’ and providing development assistance, without first controlling the territory, is flawed. It is a basic truth that one cannot develop something unless it is under one’s control. It is therefore not enough to improve superstructures but considerable effort has to be made in India to develop from the system from its roots and then move upwards.

Despite the best of arrangements at security that one can conceive, it is an accepted fact that a terrorist attack of smaller or greater magnitude can occur. The strongest deterrent at that juncture is always going to be the manner and sharpness of the response of the state, its people and the media. Therefore, Quick Response Mechanisms, which first seek to neutralise the attack through specialised forces and then restrict the fallout through administrative mechanisms, have to be in position all the time. This is not an easy task in a vast country like where the threat is diverse geographically and in its nature. Some of these weaknesses showed up in the Mumbai carnage in November 2008 although the Government has sought to remedy some of these since then as described earlier.

Initial responses to an outbreak of insurgency have to be force related and resort to discussions across a negotiating table with the insurgent even where the demands are known, should be non-negotiable for the state or simply unacceptable.

It is therefore necessary to discuss India’s experience in handling the three kinds of insurgencies that have afflicted the country – the Punjab insurgency, the North Eastern states and the Kashmir imbroglio.

THE PUNJAB

This has been a success story but after a long trial of initiatives that were not only ineffective but also counterproductive. The 1980s were marked by counter terrorism policies that showed confusion and indecision. After the tragic events of that period marked by extreme violence, attempts to suppress the movement through force were not only half hearted but also attempts to negotiate with the terrorists only confirmed the basic principle that premature negotiations not only strengthen the terrorist, stiffen his resolve but also weaken and confuse the counter terrorist forces. Each peace negotiation had given the terrorists that much breathing space to recoup and regroup.

Besides the terrorists continued to receive extensive support from Gen Zia ul Haq’s Pakistan at a time when all major powers were distracted by their own involvement against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Insurgency against the Soviets received wide support and the West was not in any position to ask ally Pakistan to curb its activities against India, long known to be a friend, or even considered an ally, of the Soviet Union.

India’s counter terrorist policy in the Punjab changed fundamentally in the 1990’s. Striking political deals with terrorists, while trying to suppress them militarily, having been unsuccessful, was substituted for an active, concerted and co-ordinated policy to hunt down the terrorists. The policy began to show remarkable change with the appointment of K P S Gill as the police chief in Punjab in 1988 and the first success came when Operation Black Thunder in May 1988 flushed out the terrorists holed up inside the Golden Temple without much loss of life or damage to the Temple. This was joint operation involving the Army, elite forces like the National Security Guards and the Punjab police. There were several other measures taken in the counter terrorism effort.

One of the first steps taken was the revival of the Punjab police which had become demoralised after sustained attacks on them by the terrorists and the neglect by the political establishment. There were new recruits, new welfare measures for the men and their families and the response of the police force was quick.

Another step was to ensure close co-operation among the military, the police, the Punjab Armed Police and the para-military forces like the CRPF and the Border Security Force. There unified command centres, tactical headquarters and the communications were interlinked and shared. The police led most of the campaigns with the Army available for support and cordon.

This surge in the activity of the police had become possible because they were better equipped, not only in the weaponry, they were more mobile, and had better personal protection. In addition to this the training of the PAP and the Army units deployed was upgraded to focus on urban as well as rural terrorism, seizure search and rescue drills were conducted to give the counter terrorist units a decisive edge and self-confidence.

Once the earlier policy of striking political deals and negotiating with the various terrorist groups and their leaders was abandoned in favour of pursuit of terrorists the opportunity for the terrorists to play one against the other disappeared. Instead greater energy was devoted to protecting the population and providing better facilities to the police and paramilitary force. Alongside it was ensured that democratic elections were not abandoned. The initial response was poor but by the early1990s but by 1993 the local body elections recorded huge voter participation to more than 80%. The battle had been joined and largely won by then.

One other aspect was a change in the attitude of the Bhutto Government towards assistance to Sikh terrorists who had taken shelter in Pakistan and had been receiving substantial assistance. International indifference to the Indian government’s repeated requests that Sikh terrorists among the immigrant Sikh population in the West, notably the UK, the US and Canada were active participants in the terror campaign in India through fund raising and political support was a factor that delayed the outcome. For India terrorism had become an international phenomenon much before this.

THE NORTH EAST

The North East of India has been characterised by a number of ethnicity based insurgencies for more than 50 years beginning with the revolt by A.Z. Phizo, the Naga leader who had taken shelter in the UK and demanded independence for the Nagas. Assam, Nagaland and Manipur are the main affected states today. The other main problem for the counterinsurgent forces in the north east was again the external support that was available to the Nagas to begin with and then to the other various groups that began operating later. The Nagas received training and weapons from the Chinese in the 1960s and later; East Pakistan and the ISI had provided them and other insurgent groups even subsequently assistance. This was something that continued to be available to the various insurgent groups even after 1971. This was possible because some years after independence, governments in Dhaka were hostile to New Delhi and were prepared to allow these activities to take place from Bangladesh territory. According to figures that were available with South Asian Terrorism Portal New Delhi, there were as many as 104 terrorist, militant or insurgent organisations of various strengths operating in the North East in 2002. Their numbers have substantially reduced but this indicates the intricacies of the problems for successive governments. Other organisations like the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) continue their sporadic activities in the North east.

The typical reaction of the politician and the local bureaucrat has usually been to first deny the existence of a problem and then to offer economic and financial palliatives which only aggravated situations that had ethnic moorings. This political policy confusion continues even today. The approach of the central government has been a mixture of economic-aid packages, political adjustments, negotiations and military action.

Yet it was only the use of force and accompanied by effective border management to control illegal migration and weapons transfer that has brought the situation somewhat under control today although insurgent attacks continue even today. Another aspect has been the changed attitude of the Bangladesh government towards insurgents who had taken shelter in Bangladesh and towards its own Islamic extremist terrorists. International co-operation thus plays a significant role in controlling and eliminating terrorism.

Numerous problems remain – chiefly of illegal migration, which impinges on the socio-economic and demographic pattern of the region/district where these migrants reach, this spawns corruption and smuggling, thereby creating a criminal-terrorist nexus that operates on both sides of the border. The arrest and detention of important leaders of the ULFA and NDFB have had a debilitating effect on these organisations but these groups have not been completely subdued yet. The various movements continue and the state remains mostly under capacity especially in the local police force, which has been under trained and inadequate, in tackling these situations more effectively.

JAMMU AND KASHMIR

This insurgency has in its present form lasted more than 20 years primarily because f the continued support it has received from Pakistan. This support has been of different kind throughout. Apart from the ideological content, the support has been financial, weapons and other logistical equipment like communication, training, and in the late 1990s and early in this decade, even Pakistan-based terrorists from the Lashkar-e- Tayyaba, Al Badr, Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami and Jaish-e-Mohammed were inducted to fight alongside the primarily Kashmiri organisation the pro-Jamaat –e-Islami Hizbul Mujahedeen. The United Jehad Council, comprising various terrorist organisations is based in Muzzafarabad while organisations like LeT and JeM have linkages with the TTP and Al Qaeda.

Fatalities in Terrorist Violence
1988 - 2010

'	Incidents	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists	Total
1988	390	29	1	1	31
1989	2154	79	13	0	92
1990	3905	862	132	183	1177
1991	3122	594	185	614	1393
1992	4971	859	177	873	1909
1993	4457	1023	216	1328	2567
1994	4484	1012	236	1651	2899
1995	4479	1161	297	1338	2796
1996	4224	1333	376	1194	2903
1997	3004	840	355	1177	2372
1998	2993	877	339	1045	2261
1999	2938	799	555	1184	2538
2000	2835	842	638	1808	3288
2001	3278	1067	590	2850	4507
2002	NA	839	469	1714	3022
2003	NA	658	338	1546	2542
2004	NA	534	325	951	1810
2005	NA	521	218	1000	1739
2006	NA	349	168	599	1116
2007	NA	164	121	492	777
2008	NA	69	90	382	541
2009	NA	55	78	242	375
2010*	NA	19	45	144	208
Total	47234	14585	5962	22316	42863

* Data till July 12, 2010
Note: Compiled from news reports and are provisional.

Data from South Asia Terrorism Portal, New Delhi

Figures show a declining graph of violence and fatalities but this could be cyclical and t is still too early to conclude that the insurgency is over. More likely the tactics may have changed. As the figures indicate there was extreme violence in the 1990s up till about 2001 after which the trend shows a downward trajectory. There were a few reasons for this. In the 1990s the state’s response was heavily militaristic, partly because there seemed no other strategy at that time, and partly because there was inadequate intelligence available. Civilian casualties, both at the hands of the terrorists who wished to instil fear and of the security forces who had inadequate intelligence, were high.

There was a policy vacuum in the early years as the state tried financial and other incentives, dialogue and negotiations with some groups, but these did not succeed as these were considered as appeasement and in fact heightened the demands of various groups. Such moves are at best short term and usually counter-productive. At the same time excessive force defeats the very purpose of gaining superiority and the difficult trick is to use appropriate force in a democracy where the press has free access to events. It is no longer the print and electronic media but the Internet that have to be managed. It is imperative therefore to for the state to first attain high ground both in terms of physical superiority over the terrorist and to wean away the population from the grip of the terrorist. Another factor was that post 2002 the Pakistan government was wary of being seen to be too active in its support of terrorism, not only in J&K but elsewhere in the country. However, Pakistan has not yet given up its basic cult of violence as a means of resolving disputes with India as the Mumbai train blasts of July 2006 and the Mumbai massacre of November 2008 would indicate.

Infiltration of terrorists from Pakistan has been a major problem. It is not just that the India-Pakistan border has been used but also that infiltration takes place via Nepal and Bangladesh. Here too better border management and better intelligence along with co-operation with these governments that helps.

In the absence of the option for hot pursuit into Pakistan or of intelligence co-operation with Pakistan, the state’s reaction was considerably hampered in the early years. Border management was tightened with fencing along the border except that in the J&K region terrain was a hindrance for effective cover. Intelligence and counter strike capabilities improved after a semblance of security was available to the population, former terrorists were effectively turned around for counter strike and intelligence roles. Once specific intelligence was available the success rate of the security forces increased and with that the confidence of the people and this in turn to greater flow of intelligence. The reverse cycle sets in.

The other aspect that was difficult to break was the funds supply route of the hawala. Again this cannot be done without the co-operation with the country which is the source of the transfer, in this case of course Pakistan and the Gulf. This remains a big challenge for the Indian government.

Ultimately there has to be a political solution to the problem but this is beyond the scope of this paper.

LEFT WING EXTREMISM

Statewise Fatalities 2010*

*Source South Asia Terrorism Portal, New Delhi

States

Civilian

SF

Naxal

Total

Andhra Pradesh

6

0

7

13

Bihar

30

6

7

43

Chhattisgarh

58

135

69

262

Jharkhand

41

12

20

73

Karnataka

0

0

1

1

Maharashtra

6

2

2

10

Orissa

29

18

13

60

Uttar Pradesh

0

0

0

0

West Bengal

243

33

40

316

Total*

413

206

159

778

* Data till July 12, 2010
Note: Compiled from news reports and are provisional

Statewise Fatalities 2009

States

Civilian

SF

Naxal

Total

Andhra Pradesh

10

0

18

28

Bihar

37

25

16

78

Chhattisgarh

87

121

137

345

Jharkhand

74

67

76

217

Maharashtra

12

52

23

87

Orissa

36

32

13

81

Uttar Pradesh

1

0

2

3

West Bengal

134

15

9

158

Total*

391

312

294

997

2008

States

Civilian

SF

Naxal

Total

Andhra Pradesh

28

1

37

66

Bihar

35

21

15

71

Jharkhand

74

39

50

153

Karnataka

3

1

3

7

Chhattisgarh

35

67

66

168

Maharashtra

2

5

7

14

Orissa

24

76

32

132

West Bengal

19

4

1

24

Uttar Pradesh

0

0

2

2

Tamil Nadu

0

0

1

1

Total

210

214

214

638

2007

States

Civilian

SF

Naxal

Total

Andhra Pradesh

24

4

45

73

Bihar

23

21

5

49

Jharkhand

69

6

45

120

Karnataka

1

1

6

8

Chhattisgarh

95

182

73

350

Maharashtra

9

2

8

19

Orissa

13

2

8

23

West Bengal

6

0

1

7

Uttar Pradesh

0

0

1

1

Total

240

218

192

650

2006

States

Civilian

SF

Naxal

Total

Andhra Pradesh

18

7

127

152

Bihar

16

5

19

40

Jharkhand

18

47

29

94

Karnataka

0

0

1

1

Chhattisgarh

189

55

117

361

Maharashtra

13

3

33

49

Orissa

3

4

16

23

West Bengal

9

7

4

20

Uttar Pradesh

0

0

2

2

Total

266

128

348

742

2005

States

Civilian

SF

Naxal

Total

Andhra Pradesh

132

21

167

320

Bihar

25

29

52

106

Jharkhand

49

27

20

96

Chhattisgarh

52

48

26

126

Orissa

13

1

3

17

Maharashtra

2

17

8

27

Karnataka

2

6

4

12

Uttar Pradesh

1

0

6

7

West Bengal

5

1

0

6

Total*

281

150

286

717

The tables above speak for themselves. A little over six months into the year and the fatalities indicate that the figure this year could well increase those of last year substantially.

The Maoists’ ideology is hostile to the Indian Constitution and democracy and seeks to replace this with an extreme left form of government. Inspired by Mao’s thoughts leftist guerrillas exploit the economic and governance grievances of the tribals and use violence and terror to achieve their goals. The main areas of Central India that are affected are Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal and the Maoists speak of a north south Red Corridor from Kathmandu to Andhra Pradesh. Government forces operating in Chhattisgarh have faced serious reverses in recent months indicating simultaneously the growing abilities of the Maoists, and the limited capacities of the state forces to handle this growing menace. Intelligence has been poor, interstate co-ordination slack and there just has not been enough trained specialised counter terror force of any kind that is available for action. There has also been policy confusion in that there seems to be stress on providing economic and social support to the population. There is not enough acceptance of the principle that infrastructure and economic benefits without security are unworkable and security is essential to enable infrastructure and socio-economic benefits to reach the people for whom they are intended. The tendency is to make politically popular gestures but without any certainty that the benefits will actually reach for those it is intended.

· Violence in general and terrorism in particular is the creed of the Maoists and at least 194 districts in 22 states have been variously affected by Left Wing Extremism.

· The Maoists have elaborate plans to co-ordinate their armed struggle with other groups in India in J&K, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur and other parts on NE India.

· They seek a broad United Front with other religious minorities, open and mass organisations among peasants and workers, students and women.

· Maoists also plan to create a peoples’ militia in the villages in the guerrilla zone to prepare for an armed class struggle.

· For this they have urban targets in the infrastructure such as highways, and in the industrial and mineral rich belt of Central India, special economic zones and so on.

· They have been imparting justice, and administering law and order in the remote no go areas in the forests from where civil administration has faded away.

The problem that the Indian state faces is current, vastly spread out and growing. The response it requires is different from the other insurgencies that the state has faced so far. There is no foreign hand, and almost all the arms and ammunition acquired have been stolen from government forces and armouries. The Maoists have established ‘liberated zones’ and it would be futile to launch operations into the free the zones. The casualties to the counter terrorist force as well as the civilians would excessive. They have to be contained first and then inroads made into their strongholds with adequate force. These are projects that have long gestation periods as forces are readied and above all, roads and communications under constant security have to be built for troops and support to move in. Since the problem is spread over several states, there is need to have instant and real time co-ordination, modernised police stations and civil-military co-ordination under a unified command in each state.

What is needed is a new policy formulation and strategy that incorporates the following broadly:-

First, we need to reinvent our police forces, one of the most neglected, underpaid, overworked and maligned forces in the country. Its faith and pride in itself has to be restored and when its ability to interact with the population is recreated, intelligence will flow. For decades this country has talked of police reforms but nothing seems to move.

Second, the police must be equipped and trained in the latest techniques, an aspect that gets neglected due to shortage of manpower, funds and political indifference. It is possible that in some cases and some states there would be need to incorporate expertise from the armed forces for training police in counter-insurgency techniques.

Third, mere deterrence and destruction of the insurgent force is not enough. It is the rebuilding of the destroyed lives and shattered economy and the end of exploitation which will be key. This must happen more or less simultaneously with the overpowering of the insurgency. If this does not happen, the insurgency will resurrect. What is needed is a multifaceted approach that involves all arms of the government, especially the infrastructure and economic agencies of education, health, agriculture and communications that extend beyond just the law and order aspect.

Fourth, since the insurgents say they are fighting a peoples’ war, we should take this to them by involving the people on the side of the government — the media being the most important component in this battle. Media coverage is oxygen to the terrorists, whether or not a particular operation succeeds. Creation of fear is also terrorist/insurgent victory; reports of massive deployment massages the insurgents’ ego and they will seek to replicate their acts. Media management is, therefore, important for they must report but not reveal.

Fifth, what is needed is a functioning National Counter Terrorism Centre to coordinate the anti-insurgency operations.

Sixth, terrorism went global decades ago. Unless there is close international co-operation among the international intelligence agencies and counter-terrorist establishments across national frontiers, it will be impossible to counter the threat effectively. There has to be a common definition of the word terrorism before any effective co-operation can emerge. Co-operation has been below the desired levels because of usually short term political and perceived strategic considerations which have only helped the terrorists/insurgents.

What Egypt's revolution means for India, the world

2011-02-15T11:22:00.002+05:30

The Middle-East may not look the same in the times ahead, says Vikram Sood.

The protest on the streets of Cairo have apparently received a fresh breath of life after the release of Wael Ghonim, the young Google marketing executive, who had launched the 'We are all Khaled Said' group on Facebook.

So far the Egyptian regime has tried to bargain through concessions but shows no signs of acquiescing to the main demand of the protesters that Hosni Mubarak [ Images ] should leave. It is possible that Ghonim may be the totem pole around which the movement will gather in the next few weeks, rather like Aung San Suu Kyi [ Images ] became the face of the Myanmar uprising in 1988. This is provided that the movement does not turn violent as some stage if the Mubarak government remains determined to continue to be machismo even as the economy loses an estimated $300 million a day because of the turmoil.

A small incident somewhere could provide the trigger and one should not be surprised if that happens. It is unlikely that a regime so dependent on external financial assistance for its survival can afford to use storm troopers to break the struggle. What is more likely is a war of attrition as the regime may try to wear down the opposition.

A great deal would depend on the staying power of the people. The Mubarak regime has been a very repressive one backed by a 2 million strong police, thousands in the intelligence, an army financed and equipped by the US and reservists. Despite this, Egyptians have overcome fear, the regime has lost its aura and Mubarak has lost his main benefactor.

As people continue to gather in their thousands at Tahrir Square several conspiracy theories are making the rounds in the absence of any clear leadership and ideological content. One aspect is to be borne in mind which is that a movement of this kind requires organisation, co-ordination and resources to sustain it. It cannot continue to remain spontaneous for a fortnight. No one really knows who or what is organising this. One aspect is clear though -- that there are at least three broad groups in the fray.

One is the April 6 Movement led by Ahmed Maher Ibrahim which has been in existence since April 6 2008. The other is Kefaya (formal name - Egyptian Movement for Change) formed in 2004, one of whose leaders George Ishak became a member of El Baradei's newly formed National Association for Change along with Mohammed Saad el-Khatami of Al Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood). Kefaya was also associated with the Ikhwan when it was formed.

Kefaya and the April 6 Movement have used the Internet to spread their message for some years now. Social networks and cell phones can guide a movement but people power on the streets does not necessarily translate into good governance. The test of the success, ideology and longevity of the movement will come later when they grapple with the problems of running Egypt [ Images ] with its economy in ruins with 30 percent inflation in food prices and its huge youth bulge with an estimated 34 percent unemployed.

It is believed that the Ikhwan has a few factions, ranging from the arch conservatives to moderate, which is understandable considering that it has been in existence since 1928 with a strong representation in the current Parliament through its independent candidates. It must be remembered that the basic creed of the Ikhwan is radically Islamic with the slogan "Islam is the Solution" -- and Syed Qutb, who called for violence against non-Muslims especially against Jews and Israel, was Osama bin Laden's [ Images ] teacher.

One does not see the overt hand of the Ikhwan in the present struggle and maybe this is tactical as they realise that if they were to come out openly the movement might lose sympathy in the West. It makes better sense to use the momentum of the present movement to position itself for later negotiations. Even as it is there is an attempt to change the discourse by describing the Ikhwan as a moderate force rather like dealing with moderate/good Taliban [ Images ] in Afghanistan.

One of the theories propounded is the one by F William Engdahl in his lengthy essay on February 5 titled "Egypt's Revolution: Creative Destruction for a 'Greater Middle East'?" he argues that what is happening in Egypt is part of a grand US design through the National Endowment for Democracy to reorder the Middle East on patterns similar to the several colour revolutions in Russia's [ Images ] periphery. Agree or not, one must read this as one of the grander conspiracy theories.

We also have the now ubiquitous Wikileaks, as revealed in the Daily Telegraph, that the Israeli, Egyptian and US governments were co-operating in the search for a successor to an aging Hosni Mubarak and the Israelis were comfortable with Omar Suleiman. As the country most directly concerned with the peace treaty, Israel's interest in the succession in Cairo was natural. With an uncertain Lebanon and the Hezbollah there and the Hamas [ Images ] in Gaza, Israel would continue to remain most concerned with the events in Egypt and their outcome.

There are other Arab regimes in the region whose autocratic rulers would be quaking in their thrones from Morocco to Yemen, all included, as they watch events in Egypt unfold and hastily make concessions to their people in an effort to stem the tide. Even though the current movement in Egypt is not Islamic in character and is Egypt specific, change in the region is inevitable and each country will probably find its own way to do so.

Iran, as a major Persian Shia regime in the regime in an Arab Sunni neighbourhood, would be keenly watching the movement in Egypt to detect any drift towards Ikhwan ideology. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in his speech last Friday (February 4) supported the people of Egypt against the humiliation they suffered because they were led by a 'servant' of Israel and the US.

Saudi Arabia has been quiet but its aging and archaic monarchical disposition facing an oppressed and discriminated Shia minority in its oil rich eastern provinces, would be a worried cabal.
India [ Images ] has extensive commercial, energy and economic interests in the region. India earns $30 billion from remittances sent in by the 6 million hardworking Indians who work in the region; there is a $125 billion trade in the region; and India imports 18 percent of its oil requirements from Saudi Arabia and 16 percent from Iran. An additional 27 percent is imported from other counties in the region. While instability is a concern for India and disruptions may occur, it is unlikely that any of these countries would actually stop exporting oil and gas considering that this is virtually the only export commodity for these countries.

However, one cannot prophecy what shape the movement will take but surely between now and September, Mubarak will have to go. It is the manner of his departure that is uncertain. Till then it is difficult to predict the day to day events.

There is far too much at stake for the West and the US to let the region slip away from its dominance all these decades. Moreover, there is a new kid on the block -- China, with its deep pockets and hunger for energy resources. Whatever happens, the arrangements worked out by the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916 to divide the Middle East among the British and the French or the arrangement worked out by President Roosevelt when he met King Ibn Saud aboard the USS Quincy on February 14, 1945 may change.

The region may not look the same in the times ahead.

Source : Rediff.com ,10th February 2011 This was written by Vikram Sood before Mubarak fell

States	Civilian	SF	Naxal	Total
Andhra Pradesh	6	0	7	13
Bihar	30	6	7	43
Chhattisgarh	58	135	69	262
Jharkhand	41	12	20	73
Karnataka	0	0	1	1
Maharashtra	6	2	2	10
Orissa	29	18	13	60
Uttar Pradesh	0	0	0	0
West Bengal	243	33	40	316
Total*	413	206	159	778